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Milani: Harassing Speech in the Public Schools

HARASSING SPEECH IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
THE VALIDITY OF SCHOOLS' REGULATION
OF FIGHTING WORDS AND THE
CONSEQUENCES IF THEY Do NOT
by

ADAM A. MILANI'
Tawnya Brady was in 8th grade when several boys began repeatedly
mocking her in the halls and on the bus. She alleged that they yelled "Moo
moo" and made vulgar references to her breasts and other parts of her body.
She gave it a few weeks to die down, but it only got worse and spread into
the classrooms. Tawnya and her mother sued, and the school district paid
2
$20,000 to settle the claim.
Katy Lyle brought a complaint with the state Human Rights Commission
after a friend told her about a bathroom stall at her high school filled with
obscene graffiti about her. "The mild ones were 'Katy Lyle is a slut' or 'Katy
Lyle is a whore,"' she said.' Despite more than a dozen complaints, the graffiti remained for 18 months until her brother finally scrubbed everything away
except the words chipped into the paint. The Human Rights Commission
found in her favor and the school settled the suit for $15,000.'
Cheltzie Hentz told her mother that she was troubled by the foul language and lewd behavior of a group of rowdy boys on her school bus. The
boys allegedly repeatedly used profanity, called her obscene names, referred
to her genitalia, and suggested that she perform oral sex on her father. Both
the U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights and the Minnesota
Department of Human Rights ruled that her school district had failed to take
5
appropriate action to stop this behavior. Cheltzie Hentz was 6 years old.
Isolated incidents? Unfortunately not. A survey of 1,600 8-11th graders commissioned by the American Association of University Women and
1. Associate, Barnes & Thornburg, South Bend, IN; B.A. University Of Notre Dame 1988;
J.D. Duke University 1991. The author would like to express his appreciation to Douglas D.
Small, for whom he prepared an earlier draft of this article which was presented at a conference
for the Indiana School Boards Association on June 4, 1993, and Lisa Tanselle, counsel to the
ISBA, who suggested the topic and provided initial research materials.
2. JOHN F. LEWIS, SUSAN C. HASTINGS & ANN C. MORGAN, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
EDUCATION 25 (1993); See also John Leighty, When Teasing Goes Over the Line, S.F. CHRON.,
Nov. 8, 1992, at 12/ZI; Margaret Lillard, Boys Will Be Boys? No More Say Schoolgirls, Fed
Up With Harassment, AP, May 31, 1993.
3. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 25; See also LILLARD, supra note 1.
4. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 25.
5. Id. at 26; See also LEIGHTY, supra note 1;Amy Saltzman, It's Not Just Teasing, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 6, 1993, at 73.
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conducted in 79 classrooms across the country in February and March, 1993,
found that four out of every five teenagers suffer sexual harassment in school.6
Overall, 76% of the girls and 56% of the boys reported that they had been the
targets of sexual comments, jokes, gestures or looks, and 53% of the students2/3rds of the girls and 42% of the boys-said they had been touched, grabbed
7
or pinched in a sexual way.
What can - and should - schools do about the harassment which their
students are suffering? While the issues of hateful and harassing speech and
political correctness on college campuses have received a great deal of attention in both the mass media 8 and legal journals,9 the very real problem of student-to-student harassment in grammar and high schools has only recently
been given attention in either forum. More specifically, there has been little
attention paid to the questions of whether (1) the First Amendment permits
grammar and high schools to control harassing speech by students, (2) schools
violate civil rights statutes meant to protect women, minorities and the handicapped if they fail to stop peer harassment, and (3) schools can be held
civilly liable for such a failure. 10
6. P. Yost, Sex Harassment in Schools Widespread, Study Finds, AP, June 2, 1993. A
complete text of the report - Hostile Hallways: The AAUW Survey on Sexual Harassmentin
America's Schools (1993), is available from the AAUW: 1-800-225-9998 ext. 251.
7. Yost, supra note 5; See also Saltzman, supra note 4, at 73; Carin Rubenstein, Fighting
Sexual Harassment in Schools, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1993, at C8.
8. See, e.g., Michael Hinds, A Campus Case: Speech or Harassment?, N.Y. TIMES, May
15, 1993, at A4. Michael Hinds, Blacks at Penn Drop Charge of Harassment, N.Y. TIMES,
May 25, 1993, at A10 (both discussing disciplinary proceedings against University of
Pennsylvania student who yelled "Shut up you water buffalo!" at several black sorority women
who were making noise outside his dormitory window); Michael Hinds, Semester Starts at
Swarthmore on Stormy Note, N.Y. TIMES, January 18, 1994, at A14 (discussing Swarthmore
College's suspension of male freshman for allegedly sexually harassing a fellow freshman
who repeatedly said "she did not want to go out with him").
9. The following are a mere sampling of law review articles published on college hate
speech codes in 1993 alone: Joseph W. Bellacosa, The Regulation of Hate Speech byAcademe
vs. The Idea of a University: A Classic Oxymoron?, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1993); Valerie
L. Brown, Hate Speech in Colleges and Universities - The Aftermath of R.A. V. v. City of St.
Paul, Minnesota, 79 EDUC. L. REP. 697 (1993); Lauri A. Ebel, UniversityAnti-Discrimination
Codes v. Free Speech, 23 N.M. L. REV. 169 (1993); Rhonda G. Hartman, Hateful Expression
and FirstAmendment Values: Toward A Theory of Constitutional Constrainton Hate Speech
at Colleges and Universities After R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 19 J.C. & U.L. 343 (1993); Robert F.
Nagel, Progressive Free Speech and the Uneasy Case for Campus Hate Codes, 64 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1055 (1993); Ronald D. Rotunda, A Brief Comment on Politically Incorrect Speech
in the Wake of R.A.V., 47 SMU L. REV. 9 (1993).
10. There are several notable exceptions to this in the legal journals. See Karen Mellencamp
Davis, Note, Reading, Writing, and Sexual Harassment: Finding a Constitutional Remedy
When Schools Fail to Address Peer Abuse, 69 IND. L. J. 1123 (1994); Elizabeth J. Gant,
Comment, Applying Title VII "Hostile Work Evnironment" Analysis to Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 - An Avenue of Relieffor Victims of Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment
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Each of these questions will be discussed in the following pages. Section I will discuss the "fighting words" doctrine and the Supreme Court's
application of the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech in the schools
and conclude that grade and high schools may regulate student speech as long
as the speech codes adopted are directed at fighting words generally, and are
not content-based. Section II will cover the relevant civil rights statutes and
their interpretation and application by the Department of Education's Office
of Civil Rights. Finally, Section III will address the issue of whether schools
can be held civilly liable for failing to stop peer harassment.
I. DOES THE FIRST AMENDMENT ALLOW SCHOOLS
TO REGULATE HATE SPEECH?

The First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech is straightforward and contains no qualifications: "Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of speech... ."" Despite the seeming clarity of this language,
it has been, and still is, the source of much controversy. This has been especially true since the Supreme Court held in Gitlow v. New York, 2 that the
First Amendment applies to the states, including state agencies such as
schools, by "incorporation" through the Fourteenth Amendment which provides that states shall not deprive individuals of their constitutional rights
13
without due process of law.
Sifting through the great body of First Amendment law reveals two key
principles supporting a grade or high school's prohibition of hate speech.
First, as discussed in part A below, the Supreme Court has held that offensive
words which are likely to provoke an immediate violent response by the person addressed are not protected by the First Amendment. 4 Second, as discussed in part B below, the Court has held that schools can prohibit speech
in the Schools, 98 DICK. L. REV. 489 (1994); Adam Michael Greenfield, Note, Annie Get
Your Gun 'Cause Help Ain't Comin': The Need For Constitutional Protectionfrom Peer
Abuse in Public Schools, 43 DUKE L. J. 588 (1993); Alison G. Myrha, The Hate Speech
Conundrumand the Public Schools, 68 N.D. L. REV. 71 (1992); Stacey R. Rinestine, Comment,
Terrorism on the Playground: What Can Be Done?, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 799 (1994); Monica L.
Sherer, Comment, No Longer Just Child's Play: School Liability Under Title IX for Peer
Sexual Harassment, 141 U.PA. L. REV. 2119 (1993); Gail Paulus Sorenson, School District
Liability for Federal Civil Rights Violations Under Section 1983, 76 EDUC. L. REP. 313
(1992); JoAnn Strauss, Peer Sexual Harassment of High School Students: A Reasonable
Student Standard and an Affirmative Duty Imposed on Educational Institutions, 10 L. &
INEQ. J. 163 (1992).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 15-82.
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which materially disrupts class work or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.' 5 Taken together, these doctrines allow schools
to regulate hateful or harassing speech.
A. The Fighting Words Doctrine
1. Announcement and Subsequent Narrowing of the Doctrine.
The Supreme Court has developed several tests in determining what
speech is protected - and not protected - by the First Amendment. One of
those tests is the so-called fighting words doctrine first announced in
16
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.
Chaplinsky was arrested when he was distributing Jehovah's Witness literature on the streets of Rochester, New Hampshire.1 7 He was warned several times that his actions were disrupting the
crowd. 8 After a riot started, a police officer escorted Chaplinsky to the police station and on the way Chaplinsky told the town marshal, "You are a God
damned racketeer" and a "Damned Fascist", and described the government of
the City of Rochester as "Fascists or agents of fascists." 9 Chaplinsky was
convicted of violating a New Hampshire law which proscribed public insults
that were "offensive, derisive or annoying."20
The Supreme Court affirmed Chaplinsky's conviction stating:
[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all
times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These
include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting
or 'fighting' words - those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
intend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality. 2'
The Supreme Court began to narrow the fighting words doctrine begin-

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra text accompanying notes 84-143.
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
Id. at 569-70.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 569.
Id.
Id. at 571-72 (emphasis added).
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ning with Cohen v. California.22 Cohen was arrested for wearing a jacket
bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" while in the Los Angeles County Courthouse.2 3 He was convicted of disturbing the peace by offensive conduct.2 4
The Supreme Court reversed Cohen's conviction. 25 It held that to determine
if an utterance should be classified as fighting words all the circumstances
must be examined, including the personal nature of the insult, the abusive
nature of the insult, and the likelihood of immediate retaliation.26 The Court
held that a state could not restrict speech merely because it believed violence
would occur. 27 Applying this test, the Court held that the words on Cohen's
jacket were not fighting words because there was no element of personal
abuse or immediate likelihood of retaliation and the words were, therefore,
28
constitutionally protected.
The Court further narrowed the fighting words doctrine in Gooding v.
Wilson. 29 Wilson and a group of people opposing the Vietnam War were
arrested when they blocked the door so that recruits could not enter the United
States Army Headquarters in Fulton County, Georgia." Wilson was arrested
after he said to one of the officers removing the protesters, "White son of a
bitch, I'll kill you. You son of a bitch, I'll choke you to death."3 Wilson was
convicted under a Georgia statute which forbid the use of "opprobrious words
or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace."3 2
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction.3 3 In doing so, the Court
only briefly mentioned fighting words, stating that the holding in Chaplinsky
was narrow and only prohibited words which "have a direct tendency to cause
acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed. '3 4 The Court's main reason for overturning the conviction, however,
was that the state statute was vague and overbroad because the definitions of
"opprobrious" and "abusive" were broader than the fighting words definition. 35 The Court later used Gooding as precedent in reversing convictions
22. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
23. Id. at 16.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 26.
26. Id. at 20-21.
27. Id. at 24.
28. Id. at 25.
29. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
30. Id. at 519 n.l.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 519.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 524.
35. Id. at 521-22.
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that were based on other overbroad offensive language statutes without reaching the issue of whether the language constituted fighting words.36
2. R.A. V. and the Application of the Fighting Words Doctrine to
Hate Speech
The Supreme Court revisited the fighting words doctrine recently in a
case involving the criminalization of hate speech. In R.A. V. v. City of St.
Paul,37 Robert Viktora and several other St. Paul teenagers had made a cross
of broken chair legs and burned it inside the fenced yard of a black family that
lived across the street.38 He was convicted under St. Paul's Bias-Motivated
Crime Ordinance which states:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning
cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to
know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor.39
40
The Supreme Court overturned the conviction.

All of the justices agreed that the ordinance was unconstitutional, but
they sharply disagreed on their reasoning. Five members of the Court joined
in an opinion written by Justice Scalia finding that the problem with the
4
ordinance was that it prohibited expression solely because of its content: '
specifically, the ordinance prohibited only those fighting words based on
"race, color, creed, religion, or gender," while permitting fighting words on
other topics. n2 According to Justice Scalia:
In its practical operation.., the ordinance goes even beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination. Displays containing some words - odious racial epithets, for example - would be prohibited to proponents of all views. But "fighting words" that do not themselves invoke race, color, creed, religion, or gender - aspersions upon a

36. See Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 910 (1972) (defendant used the phrase

"mother fuckers" when referring to teachers, the school board, and the town at a school board
meeting); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132 (1974) (defendant yelled "you
God damn m.f. police").

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
Id. at 2541.
Id. at 2541.
Id.
Id. at 2542.
Id. at 2541.
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person's mother, for example - would seemingly be usable ad libitum in
the placards of those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc. tolerance and
equality, but could not be used by that speaker's opponents. One could
hold up a sign saying, for example, that all "anti-Catholic bigots" are
misbegotten; but not that all "papists" are, for that would be insult and
provoke violence "on the basis of religion." St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle,
while requiring the
43
other to follow Marquis of Queensbury Rules.
Justice White agreed that the statute was unconstitutional but strongly
disagreed with Justice Scalia's reasoning.4 4 He argued that while the ordinance reached unprotected conduct, it also punished expressive activity that
"causes only hurt feelings, offense, or resentment. '45 Since this expressive
activity is protected by the First Amendment, he held that the ordinance was
4 6
"fatally overbroad and invalid.
Justice Stevens also felt that the ordinance was overbroad, but disagreed
with Justice White's view that all fighting words "are wholly unprotected by
the First Amendment. ' 47 Instead of such a categorical approach, Stevens
argued that a number of factors should be considered in determining the validity of a content-based regulation. Among the factors are the "content and
context" of the speech, 48 the "character" 49 of the speech, and the "scope of the
restrictions."5 Utilizing these factors, Stevens found that the St. Paul ordinance would be valid were it not overbroad."
Finally, Justice Blackman drafted a brief concurrence because of his fear
about the harm of the decision and the possible motive of the majority.5 2
43. Id. at 2547-48 (emphasis in original). Justice Scalia did note that even the prohibition
against content discrimination which the majority asserted was not absolute. Instead it applied
differently in the context of proscribable speech than in the area of fully protected speech.
Id. at 2545. For example, he noted that the federal government can criminalize threats of
violence directed against the President and that states could choose to regulate price advertising
in one industry but not in others because the risk of fraud is, in its view, greater in that
industry. Id. at 2546. He stated, however, that in regulating such speech, the government
cannot do so on the basis of content. For example, he stated that the federal government may
not criminalize only those threats against the President that mention his policy on aid to
inner-cities and that a state may not prohibit "only that commercial advertising that depicts
men in a demeaning fashion". Id.
44. Id. at 2550.
45. Id. at 2560.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2567.
48. Id. at 2567.
49. Id. at 2568.
50. Id. at 2569.
51. Id. at 2571.
52. See id. at 2560-61.
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Specifically, he feared that the majority "manipulated doctrine" because it
was "distracted from its proper mission" and decided this issue over "politically correct speech" and "cultural diversity," neither of which was before the
Court.5 3
Thus, while the Court unanimously overturned the St. Paul ordinance,
there is no unanimity of judicial opinion.54 In fact, as evidenced by the sharp
words they hurl at each other in the majority and concurring opinions, the
division between the Justices is deep. Justice Scalia, for example, terms
White's opinion, "a simplistic, all-or-nothing-at-all approach.., at odds with
common sense and with our jurisprudence as well."55 White responds by
calling Scalia' s reasoning "transparently wrong," 56 the examples he uses in his
opinion "preposterous,"5 7 the distinctions he draws "senseless, ' 58 and the
decision "mischievous at best. ' 59 Similarly, Justice Stevens calls Scalia's
approach "an adventure in a doctrinal wonderland, ' 60 labels his examples
"fantastical, ' 6 and suggests that "the Court does not in fact mean much of
63
and "wreaks havoc in an area of settled law."
what it says in its opinion
3. Mitchell and the Enhancement of Criminal Sentences for
Discriminatory Motives
Perhaps because of the deep divisions within the Court in R.A. V., the
Court soon heard arguments in a case dealing with a Wisconsin statute which
enhanced the sentences for persons who intentionally selected a person
against whom a crime is committed because of their race, religion, color,
disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry. Wisconsin v.
Mitchell.64 In resolving a split among the states 65 on the constitutionality of
53. Id. at 2560-2561.
54. Id. at 2541.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 2543 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 2551.
Id. at 2555.
Id. at 2556 n.9.
Id. at 2560.
Id. at 2562.

61. Id.
62. Id. at 2563 n. 1.
63. Id. at 2566.

64. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
65. See State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 1992) (enhancement statute held
unconstitutional); In re Joshua H., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291 (Ct. App. 1993) (statute upheld);
People v. Miccio, 589 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Crim. Ct. 1992) (statute upheld); People v. Mulqueen,
589 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Crim. Ct. 1992) (statute upheld); State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558 (Or.
1992) (statute upheld). Two lower appellate courts in Florida had split on the issue. Richards
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such enhancement statutes, however, the Court distinguished R.A. V. and did
nothing to resolve its deep divisions on the content-based regulation of
speech .66
The Wisconsin Supreme Court had struck down the state's penalty enhancement statute as it was applied to Mitchell.6 7 Mitchell, who is black,
joined a group of young black men who were discussing a scene from the
movie "Mississippi Burning" 68 where a white man beat a young black boy who
was praying. 69 Mitchell asked the group: "Do you all feel all hyped up to
move on some white people? ' 70 A short time later, a 14-year old white male
approached the apartment complex.7 ' He said nothing to the group and merely
walked by and to the other side of the street. Mitchell then said: "You all want
to fuck somebody up? There goes a white boy; go get him. '72 Mitchell then
counted to three and pointed the group in the white boy's direction.73 The
group beat him severely and stole his tennis shoes. 74 The boy remained in a
coma for four days and suffered extensive injuries and possibly permanent
brain damage.75
Relying on R.A.V., the Wisconsin Supreme Court invalidated the penalty-enhancement statute. 76 The court's decision was based on two lines of
reasoning. First, it found that the statute punished thought because it punished
the perpetrator for his "motive." Since the majority in R.A. V. had held that
content-based laws are unconstitutional, 77 the court reasoned that the penaltyenhancement statute was invalid because it would punish the defendant for the
content of his thought. 78 Second, the court reasoned that because speech will
79
often be used to prove the element of bias, the statute would chill speech.

v. State, 608 So.2d 917 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (enhancement statute found unconstitutional);
Dobbins v. State, 605 So.2d 922 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (enhancement statute held
constitutional).
66. See Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
.67. Mitchell at 2197.
68. Id. at 2196.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2196-2197.
73. Id. at 2197.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2197-98; See also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 811 (1992).
77. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. 2538.
78. 485 N.W.2d at 811; see also Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2197 (1993).
79. Id. at 816 (1992); see also Mitchell, 113 S.Ct. at 2198.
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The Supreme Court reversed the Wisconsin decision and held that the
penalty-enhancement statute passed constitutional muster.8 ° In doing so, the
Court distinguished R.A. V.8 The Court noted that the ordinance struck down
in R.A.V. was explicitly directed as expressions, i.e. "speech," or "messages, ' 82 while the statute in Mitchell was aimed at enhancing the sentences83
for conduct, such as assault, which is unprotected by the First Amendment.
The message of the R.A. V. majority and Mitchell, then, is that states can
proscribe both "fighting words" and bigoted conduct so long as the regulation
of speech is content neutral. Any attempt to bar only a certain type of speech
will be struck down as overbroad.84
The FirstAmendment in the School

B.

In Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community Sch. Dist.,85 the Supreme Court
made clear that students and teachers do not "shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."86 The Court
went on to state, "[s]chool officials do not possess absolute authority over
their students. Students in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our Constitution."87 The Court recognized, however, that schools have a
legitimate interest in maintaining order and discipline.88 Specifically, the
J
Court stated that:
conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior - materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights
of others is... not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of speech.8 9

1. Colleges
The Supreme Court and lower courts generally have held that college
students have greater free speech rights than do elementary and high school
students. This is perhaps best reflected in Healy v. James,9 0 where the Court

80. 113 S. Ct. at 2202.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 2200-01.
R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2547 (1992).
Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2201.
See id.;R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. 2538.
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Id. at 506.
Id. at 511.
Id. at 513.
Id. at 513.
408 U.S. 169 (1972).
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found that Central Connecticut State College had infringed upon its students'
free speech rights when it denied campus recognition to the local chapter of
the Students for a Democratic Society ("SDS"), a group associated with militant activities directed at campus communities throughout the country. 91
The Court stated that:
[t]he precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because of
the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should
apply with less force on college campuses than in the community at large.
Quite to the contrary, "[t]he vigilant protection of Constitutional freedoms
is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools."
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,489 (1960). The college classroom with
its surrounding environs is peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas," and we
break no new constitutional ground in reaffirming the Nation's dedication
to safeguarding academic freedoms.92
Thus, the Court stated a "'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate

the appropriateness of [its] action. 9 3 It stated that the group must actually
"disrupt the work and discipline of the school" or interfere with the rights of
others before the speech could be quashed. 94 The Court did note, however,
that a college, like other state actors, could impose reasonable regulations
with respect to the time, place and manner in which student groups conducted
their speech-related activities. 95
In Papish v. Board of Curators,96 the Court held that a university could
not regulate the content of student speech. In Papish,a university student had
been expelled for distributing a school newspaper that contained an article
titled, "Mother Fucker Acquitted,"9' 7 which discussed an organization called
"Up Against the Wall, Mother Fucker." 98 This edition of the newspaper also
included a political cartoon depicting policemen raping the Statue of Liberty
and the Goddess of Justice, with a caption reading "With Liberty and Justice
for All."9' 9

The Supreme Court held that the student should not be expelled because
the university had disapproved of the "content of the newspaper rather than
91. Id. at 169.
92. 408 U.S. at 180-81 (citation omitted).
93. Id. at 184.
94. Id. at 189 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
513 (1969)).
95. 408 U.S. at 192-93.
96. 410 U.S. 667 (1973).
97. Id. at 667.
98. Id. at 668.
99. Id.at 667.
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the time, place, or manner of its distribution.""' The Court stated that "the
First Amendment leaves no room for the operation of a dual standard in the
academic community with respect to the content of speech." 101
2. The Constitutionality of Hate Speech Codes on College Campuses
Despite the tremendous amount of legal scholarship on the issue of hate
speech codes on college campuses, there have been very few decisions on the
constitutionality of such codes. Given the Supreme Court's statements on the
regulation of speech in a university setting, however, it is not surprising that
the few decisions which have been handed down have universally held that
these codes violate students' First Amendment freedoms.
The University of Michigan's policy stated that students would be subject to discipline for "[any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or
victimizes an individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual
orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or
Vietnam-era veteran status." 102 The University's Office of Affirmative Action issued an interpretive guide for the policy entitled What Students Should
Know about Discriminationand DiscriminatoryHarassmentby Students in
the University Environment.l°3 Among the examples of sanctionable conduct
were:
A flyer containing racist threats distributed in a residence hall.
A male student makes remarks in class like "Women just aren't as good
in this field as men," thus creating a hostile learning atmosphere for female classmates.
Male students leave pornographic literature and jokes on the desk of a
female graduate student.
their roommate in the residence hall move out and
Two men demand that
1 04
be tested for AIDS.
The district court struck down the policy, relying on the cases following
Chaplinsky which had found statutes to be overbroad which punished speech
which did not rise to the level of "fighting words."1 05

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 670 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 671.
Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 856 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
Id. at 857.
Id. at 858.
Id. at 864 (citing Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) & Lewis v. New Orleans,
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A hate speech policy at the University of Wisconsin provided that the
University could discipline a student:
[ffor racist or discriminatory comments, epithets or other expressive behavior directed at an individual or on separate occasions at different individuals, or for physical conduct, if such comments, epithets, or other
expressive behavior or physical conduct intentionally:
1. Demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry or age of the individual or individuals; and
2. Create an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for educa06
tion, university-related work, or other university-authorized activity.1
The court found that this policy was overbroad and did not fit within the fighting words doctrine.° 7
More recently in Dambrot v. CentralMichigan Univ.,"°8 the court struck
down the university's speech code in a case involving a basketball coach who
had been fired after he used the word "nigger" in a locker room talk he gave
to his players, many of whom were black and who joined him as plaintiffs
seeking his reinstatement. 0 9 The policy there prohibited:
any intentional, unintentional, physical, verbal, or non-verbal behavior
that subjects an individual to an intimidating, hostile or offensive educational, employment or living environment by (c) demeaning or slurring
individuals through ... written literature because of their racial or ethnic
affiliation; or (d) using symbols, epitaphs [sic] or slogans that infer negative connotations about an individual's racial or ethnic affiliation."10
Citing R.A.V., the court found the policy to be invalid, and stated that "Itihe
expanse of the suppression of speech made possible by this CMU policy is as
remarkable as it is illegal."'''
3. Grade and High Schools
The Supreme Court's treatment of student free speech rights in high
schools and grammar schools differs sharply from that given to the rights of
college students. Despite Tinker's statement that those rights are not shed at

415 U.S. 130 (1974)).
106. UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
107. Id.at 1181.
108. 839 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
109. Id. at 480.
110. Id. at 481 (footnote omitted).
111. Id. at 484.
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the school house gate,' 12 the Court has been willing to allow high schools and
grammar schools to regulate speech so long as they can show it will disrupt
school activities.
a. Substantial DisruptionTest
The holding in Tinker has been referred to as the "substantial disruption
test." ' 3 In Tinker, the Court found no substantial disruption where the students merely wore black arm bands in protest of the Vietnam War and there
was no evidence that they either interrupted school activities or caused any
14
disorder in the classroom."
In Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,"' however, the Court upheld a
school's disciplining a student for giving a "lewd" speech at a school assembly." 6 In doing so, the Court did not rely on the substantial disruption test
announced in Tinker, but did extensively discuss the role of public schools in
society and their ability to sanction student speech." 7
In Fraser,a student gave the following speech at a high school assembly in support of a candidate for a student government office:
I know a man who is firm - he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his
character is firm - but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students of

Bethel, is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary,
he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts
- he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally - he succeeds.

Jeff is a man who will go to the very end - even the climax, for each and
every one of you.
So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president - he'll never come between you
and the best our high school can be."'
During Fraser's delivery of this speech, some students hooted and yelled, and
some by gestures graphically simulated the sexual activities alluded to in the
speech."19 Other students appeared to be bewildered and embarrassed by the
112. Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). See also
text accompanying notes 84-88.

113. 393 U.S. at 506.
114. Id.
115. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).

116. Id. at 678.
117. Id. at 681-83.
118. Id. at 687 (Brennan J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 678.
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20
One teacher reported that on the day following the speech it was
speech.1
necessary to forego a portion of the scheduled class lesson to discuss the
l2
Fraser was suspended for three days and his name was removed
speech.'
from the list of candidates for graduation speaker.12 2 Fraser sued, alleging that
the school sanctions violated his freedom of speech, and was awarded $278
in damages and $12,750 in litigation costs and attorneys fees. 23 The Supreme
24
Court reversed this decision.

According to the Court, the role and purpose of public schools is to
It must inculcate the habits
and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and
as indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community and the

"prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic. ...

nation.'

2 5

Based on this, the Court stated:

Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to
prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse. Indeed,
the "fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic
political system" disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or
highly threatening to others. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the
states from insisting that certain modes of expression are inappropriate
and subject to sanctions. The inculcation of these values is truly the "work
of the schools." The determinationof what mannerof speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriateproperly rests with the school
126

board.

Thus, the Court held that the school district acted entirely within its author27
ity in sanctioning Fraser in response to his lewd and indecent speech.
b. Public Forum Test

In Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,128 the Supreme Court declined 2to9

apply the Tinker substantial disruption test to a school speech controversy.1
Instead, the Court for the first time applied public forum analysis to a student
speech case. 3 0

120. Id.
121. Id.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id. at 679.
Id. at 680.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 683 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. at 685.
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
Id. at 272-73.
Id. at 267-70, 273.
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In Hazelwood, a school principal directed the advisor of a school-sponsored student newspaper to delete two pages containing stories on divorce and
pregnancy.' 3 ' In upholding the principal's action, the Court relied not on the
substantial disruption test but looked to whether or not the newspaper was a
1' 3 2
"public forum.'
The Court first decided that schools were not a public forum.
The public schools do not possess all the attributes of streets, parks, and
other traditional public forums that "time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions." Hence, school facilities may be deemed to
be public forums only if school officials have "by policy or by practice"
opened those facilities "for indiscriminate use by the general public" or
by some segment of the public, such as student organizations.'33
The Court then drew a distinction between school-sponsored speech, such as
the newspaper and plays, and held that the school could exercise control over
13 4
it as long as such control was reasonable.
4. The Constitutionality of Hate Speech Codes in Public High
Schools and Grade Schools
No matter what test is used, it is clear that public grade and high schools
have a greater power to limit speech than do colleges or society in general.
Excellent discussions of some of the reasons for and problems created by this
are found in recent articles by Gordon Danning and Alison G. Myhra.' 35
Myhra's article in particular provides an excellent defense for the use of
hate speech codes in the public schools.'3 6 She first notes that hate messages
131. Id. at 264.
132. Id. at 267. Because the Court did not rely on the Tinker standard in resolving the
issue presented, it did "not decide whether the Court of Appeals correctly construed Tinker as
precluding school officials from censoring student speech to avoid 'invasion of the rights of
others,' . . . except where the speech could result in tort liability to the school." Hazelwood,
484 U.S. at 273 n.5 (citation omitted). Some have suggested that the "invasion of the rights
of others" prong of Tinker requires the commission of a tortious act by one student against
another, such as a battery or libel, resulting in a potential liability for the school. Hazelwood,
at 289 (Brennan J., dissenting); See also Note, Administrative Regulation of the High School
Press, 83 MICH. L. REV. 625 (1984).
133. Hazelwood at 267 (citations omitted).
134. Id. at 569.
135. Gordon Danning, Freedom of Speech in Public Schools: Using Communication
Analysis to Eliminate the Role of EducationalIdeology, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 123 (1991);
Alison G. Myhra, The Hate Speech Conundrum and the Public Schools, 68 N.D. L. REV. 71
(1992).
136. See Myhra, supra note 135.
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and their stigmatization can cause long-term psychological harm and that the
Supreme Court has restricted children's free speech rights in other contexts
to protect them from these harms.'317 For example, in Ginsberg v. New York,' 38
the Court upheld New York's criminal obscenity statute prohibiting the sale
to children under the age of 17 of materials deemed to be obscene to children
but not necessarily to adults.' 39 Similarly, in FCCv. PacificaFoundation,4 °
the Court held that the Federal Communication Commission had the power to
proscribe the broadcast during day time hours of material that is indecent but
not obscene..

41

-

Myhra also notes that the lower courts, applying Tinker have held that
certain expressive symbols, school songs, and team names (such as the Confederate -flag, the song "Dixie," and the name "Rebels") may be proscribed
because their racially charged-history may have a potentially: disruptive presence in the educational setting. 142 In light of these cases and the discussion in
Tinker, Fraser,and Hazelwood on the role of public schools, Myhra argues
that hate speech codes are not only constitutional but necessary for the wellbeing of children.' 43

Other commentators agree with Myhra that speech codes in public
schools will be held constitutional. However, in light of the R.A. V. majority's
proscription of content-based regulation, they caution against speech codes
which only identify certain kinds of speech as impermissible. Instead they
suggest that school districts should adopt rules directed against fighting words
generally so that the regulations apply to all students.
137. Id. at 78-85.
138. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
139. Id.
140. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
141. Id.
142. See e.g., Augustus v. School Board, 507 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1975)(holding that public
school could bar the use of the Confederate flag as a school symbol and the use of the name
"Rebels" for athletic teams and extracurricular activities because of racial tension and potential
disruption); Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1972)(holding that schools could prohibit
the use of the Confederate flag as the school flag, "Rebels" as the team name, and "Dixie" as
the school pep song and could suspend students for wearing clothing bearing the Confederate
flag where necessary to prevent potential danger and disruption due to racial tensions in the
school), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973).
143. See Myhra, supra note 135.
144. See e.g., Richard Bacca & H. C. Hudgins, Jr., Student Speech and the FirstAmendment:
The Courts Operationalizethe Notion of Assaultive Speech, 89 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1994); David
Schimmel, Are "Hate Speech" Codes Unconstitutional? An Analysis of R.A. V. v. St. Paul, 76
EDUC. L. REP. 653 (1992); David Tatel, et. al, The 1991-92 Term of the United States Supreme
Court and its Impact on Public Schools, 78 EDUC. L. REP. 3 (1992).
An interesting case applying the "fighting words" doctrine in the school context was
decided early last year. In Lovell v. Poway Sch. Dist., 847 F. Supp. 780 (S.D. Cal. 1994), a
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A section of a school dress code which banned clothing which "harasses,
threatens, intimidates or demeans" certain individuals or groups was recently
struck down for precisely this flaw: It identified a certain kind of speech as
impermissible without requiring that it cause a substantial disruption within
the school.145 Pyle arose out of a school's attempt to regulate clothing emblazoned with objectionable writing and two students' escalating efforts to test
those regulations. The two students were Jeffrey and Jonathan Pyle, the sons
14 6
of a constitutional law professor at Mount Holyoke College.
In March 1993, Jeffrey wore a T-shirt to his gym class bearing the slo'
Jeffrey's gym teacher
gan "Coed Naked Bank; Do It To The Rhythm."147
found the shirt objectionable and warned him not to return to her class wearing it. In response, Jeffrey wrote a letter to the acting prinicpal stating that he
felt his constitutional right to freedom of expression was being violated and
that he intended to wear the shirt again. Jeffrey did, in fact, wear the shirt
again to his next gym class. His gym teacher asked Jeffrey to change it. When
he refused, he was given three detentions for insubordination and sent to the
office. The acting principal, unsure of whether the T-shirt was permissible
under the dress code then in effect, put Jeffrey's detentions on hold until he
could get guidance from members of the school committee at its next scheduled meeting. 4 8 At the meeting, Jeffrey presented his views regarding censorship and the boundaries of a student's First Amendment rights, and the
high school student challenged a suspension imposed after she told a school counselor following
a long, frustrating day of trying to get her schedule changed either: "If you don't change the
schedule, I'm going to shoot you," or "I'm so angry, I could just shoot someone." Id. at 783.
The court found the student's statement to be "inappropriate and impatient" but reversed her
three-day suspension from school. Id. The court based its decision on its findings that the
student
did not make the requisite "threat" required by law, under either contention as to the
exact words spoken, to allow infringement on her right of free speech as guaranteed
by the Education Code and the United States Constitution. The Court simply did not
feel that there was the gravity of purpose and likelihood of execution, nor the intent
to harm or assault to allow the imposition of discipline by way of suspension in this
case.
Id. at 785.
145. Pyle v. South Hadley Sch. Committee, 861 F. Supp. 157 (D. Mass. 1994).
146. Id. at 160.
147. Id. at 161. This shirt was a Christmas gift given to Jeffrey by his mother celebrating
Jeffrey's involvement in the school band. Id.
148. The dress code then in effect was set out in a folder given to each student at the
beginning of the school year. A section entitled "Personal Appearance" stated:
Personal appearance should not disrupt the educational process, call individual
attention to the individual, violate federal, state, or local health and obscenity laws,
or affect the welfare and safety of the students, teachers, or classmates. Students
will be asked to change inappropriate attire.
Id. at 160.
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school committee agreed not to enforce the three detentions given to him.
At the meeting, and in a subsequent letter, Jeffrey also asked the members of the school committee to adopt a new, formal dress code. The committee did so less than a month later. The policy provided:
Students ...

are not to wear clothing that:

1. Has comments or designs that are obscene, lewd or vulgar.
2. Is directed toward or intended to harass, threaten, intimidate, or demean an individual or group of individuals because of sex, color, race, religion, handicap, national origin, or sexual orientation.
3. Advertises alcoholic bevarages, tobacco products, or illegal drugs.
If such clothing is worn to school, students will be required to change
or will be sent home to do so.
as the views are
Clothing expressing political views is allowed as long
149
not expressed in a lewd, obscene or vulgar manner.
On the day the code was to take effect, Jeffrey wore a T-shirt to school
with the slogan "Coed Naked Civil Liberties: Do It To The Amendments" to
show his opposition to the new dress code. 150 Jeffrey's younger brother,
In the days prior to the school committee's meeting, Jeffrey deliberately continued to
test the rules by wearing two new shirts to gym class. One depicted two men in naval
uniform kissing each other, with the tag line "Read My Lips." The second depicted a marijuana
leaf and stated "Legalize It." Neither shirt prompted an objection. Id. at 161.
149. Id. at 162. This was subsequently amended. For the 1993-94 school year, South
Hadley's dress code read, in pertinent part:
e. Students are not to wear clothing (including hats) which causes a disruption to
the educational process or to the orderly operation of the school. This includes
clothing that:
1. Has comments, pictures, slogans, or designs that are obscene, profane, lewd or
vulgar.
2. Harasses, threatens, intimidates or demeans an individual or group of individuals
because of sex, color, race, religion, handicap, national origin or sexual orientation.
If such clothing is worn to school, students will be required to change or cover
said clothing or will be sent home to do so. Refusal to change or cover said clothing
will result in the student's not being allowed to attend class until they have complied
with the code. The student should understand that failure to attend class may subject
him to a penalty under the existing class attendance and truancy regulations at South
Hadley High School and the South Hadley School Department.
Clothing expressing political views clearly is allowed as long as the views are not
expressed in a lewd, obscene, profane or vulgar manner.
Id. at 163-64.
150. The shirt was a gift to Jeffrey's father from him Mount Holyoke students. Id. at 162, n.2.
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Jonathan, wore a shirt bearing the slogan "See Dick Drink. See Dick Drive.
See Dick Die. Don't Be A Dick."'' Jeffrey and Jonathan were sent to the
administration office and were told their shirts were not acceptable. They
were given three options: turn the shirts inside out, change into other shirts,
or go home and change. They decided to go home and did not return to school
until the next day. 5 2 In the following days, Jonathan continued to protest the
dress code by wearing home-made shirts stating "Coed Naked Gerbils: Some
People Will Censor Anything" and "Coed Naked Censorship - They Do It In
South Hadley." 5 3 In addition, he also wore a shirt celebrating the Smith College centennial, which read "A Century of Woman on Top." The school did
not find any of these shirts to be in violation of the dress code. 54 Jeffrey and
Jonathan then continued their protest by filing a suit challenging the dress
code's constitutionality.
In evaluating the dress code, the district court looked to the Supreme
Court's decisions in Tinker, Fraserand Hazelwood, and stated:
These cases reveal at least three approaches to the First Amendment rights
of high school students. First, "vulgar" or plainly offensive speech
(Fraser-type speech) may be prohibited without a showing of disruption
or substantial interference with the school's work. Second, school-sponsored speech (Hazelwood-type speech) may be restricted when the limitation is reasonably related to legitimate educational concerns. Third,
speech that is neither vulgar nor school-sponsored (Tinder-type speech)
may only be prohibited if it causes a substantial and material disruption
of the school's operation.' 55
151. Id. at 162.
152. Id.

153. Id. at 163.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 166 (citing Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir.
1992)). In Chandler,the Ninth Circuit enunciated these three distinct areas of student speech
and then reversed a lower court's holding that buttons worn by students which referred to
replacements for striking teachers as "scabs" were "offensive" and "disruptive." The court in
Chandler stated that it had
discerned three distinct areas of student speech from the Supreme Court's school
precendents: (1) vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive speech, (2) schoolsponsored speech, and (3) speech that falls into neither of these categories. We
conclude ... that the standard for reviewing the suppression of vulgar, lewd, obscene,
and plainly offensive speech is governed by Fraser, school-sponsored speech by
Hazelwood, and all other speech by Tinker.
978 F.2d at 529 (cites omitted).
It should be noted, however, that a consurring judge stated that in reaching its ultimate
decision the court "did not have to reach out and create a comprehensive three-part categorical
scheme for deciding all student speech cases." 978 F.2d at 532 (Goodwin, J., concurring).
Judge Goodwin then stated:
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In applying these approaches, the court in Pyle upheld the dress code's
prohibition on clothing that is "obscene, profane, vulgar or lewd" but struck
down the ban on clothing that "harasses, intimidates or demeans an individual
or group of individuals." The court cited Fraserin support of its first holding, and stated, "[S]chools are entitled to prohibit speech that is expressed in
lewd, vulgar or offensive terms, regardless of whether the speech causes a
1
substantial disruption. 156
If lower courts need categorical guidance in determining how to approach student
speech cases they should look to the one implicitly provided by Justice White in
Hazelwood rather than the one established by the majority here. Justice White
distinguished between (I) "a student's personal expression that happens to appear
on the school premises," and (2) "educators' authority over school-sponsored
[activities] that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably
perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school." 484 U.S. at 270-71, 108 S. Ct. at
569-70. In the first category the more vigorous judicial scrutiny of Tinker is applied.
Generally, school authorities must show that they could reasonably forecast the
student's expression would cause substantial disruption or would materially interfere
with the school activities in order to punish such expression without interference
with the student's First Amendment rights. In the second category, judicial scrutiny
of the actions of school authorities is far more dererential since the school must be
able to set "high[er] standards for the student's speech that is disseminated under its
auspices." Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-72, 108 S. Ct. at 570.
Id. at 532, n.1.
156, 861 F. Supp. at 168. The court also cited previous decisions which had upheld school
dress codes. See Broussard v. Sch. Bd. of City of Norfolk, 801 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Va.
1992) (upholding suspension of 12-year-old girl wearing shirt with the words "Drugs Suck"
on the front and the name of the group NKOTB (New Kids on the Block) on the back); Gano
v. Sch. Dist. No. 411 of Twin Falls County, 674 F. Supp. 796 (D. Idaho 1987) (denying
student's motion for preliminary injunction and holding that shirt containing a caricature of
three school administrators drinking alcohol and acting drunk was "clearly offensive" and
need not be tolerated by school officials).
More recently in Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 738 (7th Cir. 1994), the
court held that a grade school student (Chelsie Baxter) who was barred from wearing shirts
which protested a school's grading and racial policies was not entitled to damages in a § 1983
action because she had failed to show that she had a "clearly established" right to free
expression. Chelsie and her parents argued that they had attempted to complain about grades,
racism and other unspecified problems at Lost Creek Elementary School when she wore Tshirts which read "Unfair Grades," "Racism," and "I Hate Lost Creek." Id. at 730. The
school principal prevented her from wearing these shirts and subjected her to unspecified
punitive actions. Id.
In the resulting suit, the principal argued that he was immune from liability under § 1983
because Chelsie did not have a "clearly established" right to free expression. Id. at 737. He
maintained that Tinker was not dispositive because it involved students older than Chelsie.
Id. The court agreed:
In this case, Chelsie was in elementary school when her attempts at self-expression
were blocked. She was at least several years younger than the youngest student in
Tinker. This does not mean that elementary school students are entitled to no First
Amendment protection. Cf. Hedges v. Wauconda Comm. Sch. Dist. No. 18, 9 F.3d
1295, 1298 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that "nothing in the first amendment postpones
the right of religious speech until high school"). But given the indications in Fraser
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The court reached the opposite conclusion, however, on the dress code
provision which prohibited "harassing" clothing.
The Constitution forbids a school from prohibiting expression of opinion
merely "because of an undifferentiated fear of apprehension of disturbance." It follows that while a school can bar a T-shirt that causes a
material disruption, they cannot prohibit one that merely advocates a
particular point of view and arouses the hostiltiy of a person with an opposite opinion. '
It then stated:
It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the 'harassment' provision of
the South Hadley dress code is aimed directly at the content of speech, not
at its potential for disruption or its vulgarity.

Despite students' more limited First Amendment rights in the school setting, South Hadley cannot silence non-vulgar, non-disruptive speech simply based upon the viewpoint expressed. Unfortunately, the "harassment"
provision of the dress code does just that:

Under the current code, if a student wore a T-shirt to South Hadley
High School containing a message expressing antipathy towards, or for
that matter sympathy with, a particular group, the school could still ban
the T-shirt, if it reasonably concluded that the message would cause a

and Kuhlmeier that age is a relevant factor in assessing the extent of a student's free
speech rights in the school, in addition to the dearth of caselaw in the lower federal
courts, we are unable to conclude that the Baxters have demonstrated that the right
[the principal] is alleged to have violated was "clearly established." Thus, [the
principal] in his individual capacity was entitled to qualified immunity with respect
to Chelsie's First Amendment claim.
Id. at 738.
One court, however, recently struck down a school dress code as applied to grade
school students. Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 1459 (C.D. Cal.
1993). The dress code at issue in Jeglin prohibited, among other things, clothing identifying
any professional sports team or college. Id. at 1460. The school district argued that the such
clothing could be barred because it was associated with gang activity that led to a disruption
of the educational environment. Id. at 1461-1462. The court struck down the code as applied
to elementary and middle school students because it found no evidence of a gang presence at
the district's elementary schools and that there was only a negligible presence in the middle
schools. Id. The court upheld the code as applied to high school students, finding that the
district had carried its burden of proof in showing a gang presence and activity resulting in
the disruption of school activities. Id. at 1462.
157. 861 F. Supp. at 171 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
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substantial and material disruption to the daily operations of the school.
Tinker allows the school to do this. But the school cannot pick and
choose; it may not prohibit antipathetic slogans but allow positive ones.
The "constitutional line is crossed when, instead of really teaching, the
educators demand that the students express agreement with the educators'
values." Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989, 994 (3d Cir.
1993). Since the harassment section of the defendant's dress code overlaps this constitutional boundary, the court will allow this portion of the
58
plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief. 1
The decision in Pyle, however, does not mean that all school "harassment" or hate speech codes will be held unconstitutional. Indeed, the court
noted that the school still could ban a shirt "if it reasonably concluded that the
message would cause a substantial and material disruption to the daily operations of the school.' 1 59 The court did not object to "harassment" or hate speech
codes per se, but to one which was content-based so that it applied only to certain kinds of speech and not to fighting words generally.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Tinker, Fraserand Hazelwood, make
it clear that schools have broad latitude in proscribing students' speech. Even
with the decision in R.A.V., school speech codes should pass constitutional
muster as long as they apply to all students and are not content-based. The
question then becomes not whether schools can bar hate speech, but the possible consequences if they fail to do so.
II. THE CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES PROHIBITING
DISCRIMINATION AND THE GUARANTEE OF A
NON-HOSTILE LEARNING ENVIRONMENT
A.

Title VI, Title IX and Section 504

Federal law prohibits programs receiving federal financial assistance
from discriminating on a variety of grounds. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964160 states that:

158. Id. at 171, citing R.A.V., 172-73. In addition to R.A.V., the court also cited Iota XI
Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1993), in
support of its position. In the latter, a university punished a fraternity because it conducted
an "ugly woman contest" that contained racist and sexist overtones. The court overturned the
sanctions imposed against the fraternity, finding that the university punished the message
conveyed by the "ugly woman contest" solely because it "ran counter to the views the
University sought to communicate to its students and the community." 993 F.2d at 393.
159. 861 F. Supp. at 173.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
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No person in the United States shall on the grounds of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal Financial Assistance.
Prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of sex and handicap, respectively, are found in Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972161 and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.162 The implementing regulations for these statutes prohibit the recipients of federal funds from denying
an individual any benefit or providing services or other benefits to an individual in a manner different from that provided to others, or from restricting
an individual in the enjoyment of any advantage or privilege enjoyed by others
1 63
on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, or handicap.
B.

Investigations by Office of Civil Rights

These statutes and regulations are enforced by the Department of
Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR). The OCR interprets Title VI and
Title IX to prohibit harassment which occurs in the recipient's educational
program because of race or sex. 164 OCR staff in its various regional offices
conduct both compliance reviews and complaint investigations.
Compliance reviews are initiated by OCR to determine whether or not
districts are complying with the civil rights laws that OCR enforces. OCR
selects institutions for a review based on information from such sources as

161. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988).
162. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
163. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(1)(i), (ii) & (iv) (1993);
C.F.R. § 106.31(b)(2), (3) & (7) (1993).

34 C.F.R. § 104.43 (1993); & 34

164. In an August 1981 Policy Memorandum, the OCR adopted the following definition
of sexual harassment:
[slexual harassment consists of verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, imposed
on the basis of sex, by an employee or agent of the recipient that denies, limits,
provides different, or conditions the provision of aid, benefits, services or treatment
protected under Title IX.
Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Education, Sexual Harassment: It's Not Academic 2
(1986) (quoting OCR Policy Memorandum from Antonio J. Califa, Director for Litigation,
Enforcement and Policy Service, to Regional Civil Rights Directors (Aug. 31, 1981)).
The author has been unable to find any OCR or court decisions dealing with harassment
of the handicapped, but given the similarities between Title VII, Title IX and Section 504, it
can be assumed that a school's failure to react to harassment against the handicapped would
also be actionable. For examples of handicapped harassment, see Lorenza Munoz, High Life;
Special Courage; Students with Handicaps Gain Fresh Perspectives on Behavior that Go
Beyond Teasing, Name-Calling, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1989, § 9, at 4.
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survey data, interest groups, the media and the general public that may indicate potential compliance problems.165 Compliance reviews involved investigation into issues such as within school discrimination, equal education
opportunities for students with limited English skills, ability grouping which
results in segregation on the basis of race or national origin, racial harassment
in education institutions, equal education opportunity for pregnant students,
appropriate identification of special education and related services for certain
student populations such as homeless children with handicaps, and discrimi66
nation on the basis of sex in athletic programs.1
The OCR also conducts complaint investigations. On March 7, 1994, the
OCR issued a document which.provides "guidance" as to the standards for
such investigations.167 The document identified two types of discrimination:
(1) different treatment of individuals because of their race,' 168 and (2) the
existence of a hostile environment. In addressing the second type of discrimination the OCR stated:
A violation of Title VI may... be found if a recipient has created or is responsible for a racially hostile environment - i.e., harassing conduct (e.g.,
physical, verbal, graphic, or written) that is sufficiently severe, pervasive
or persistent so as to interfere with or limit the ability of an individual, to
participate in or benefit from the services, activities or privileges provided
by a recipient....
Under this analysis, an alleged harasser need not be an agent or employee
of the recipient, because this theory of liability under title VI is premised
on a recipient's general duty to provide a non-discriminatory educational
69
environment. 1

165. Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Information about the Office for Civil
Rights 5 (1991).

166. Id.
167. Investigative Guidance on Racial Incidents and Harassment Against Students, 59 Fed.
Reg. 11448 (1994). While addressing only Title VI complaints based on discrimination because
of race, color, or national origin, these guidelines are helpful in evaluating Title IX in Section
504 claims as well. The "guidance" includes as an appendix a "compendium of legal
resources". Id. at 11451. In it the OCR notes that "in addition to racial incidents/harassment
cases, many sexual harassment cases are cited throughout this compendium - because the
legal standards and theories applicable to these two different types of discrimination are
similar." Id. at 11451 n.2.
168. For the sake of simplicity and clarity, the term "race" was used throughout the guidance
to refer to all forms of discrimination prohibited by Title VI - i.e., race, color, and national
origin. 59 Fed. Reg. at 11448 n.2.
169. 59 Fed. Reg. at 11448. In applying the different treatment analysis, OCR staff will
address the following questions:
(1) Did an official or representative (agent or employee) of the recipient treat
someone differently in a way that interfered with or limited the ability of a student
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To establish a violation of Title VI under the hostile environment theory,
the OCR must determine that:
(1) a racially hostile environment existed;
(2) the recipient had actual or constructive notice of the racially hostile
environment; and
(3) the recipient failed to respond adequately to redress the racially hostile environment. 170
Whether the conduct constitutes a hostile environment must be determined
from the totality of the circumstances with particular attention paid to whether
(1) the racial harassment is severe, pervasive or persistent; (2) the school has
actual or constructive notice of the harassment; and (3) the school's response
17 1
to the harassment.
In determining whether the harassment is severe, pervasive or persistent,
OCR will examine the context, nature, scope, frequency, duration, and location of racial incidents, as well as the identity, number, and relationships of
the persons involved.1 7 2 In most cases the harassment must consist of more
than a casual or isolated incident.1 73 However, a racially hostile environment
requiring appropriate responsive action by a school may result from a single
incident that is sufficiently severe. 74 Racial acts need not be targeted at the
complainant in order to create a racially hostile environment. 175 Also, the
harassment need not be based on the victim's or complainant's race so long
as it is racially motivated. 176 For example, it might be based on the race of a
to participate in or benefit from a program or activity of the recipient?
(2) Did the different treatment occur in the course of authorized or assigned duties
or responsibilities of the agent or employee?
(3) Was the different treatment based on race, color, or national origin?
(4) Did the context or circumstances of the incident provide a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory, nonpretexual basis for the different treatment?
Id. at 11448-49 (footnote omitted). If questions 1 through 3 are answered "yes" and question
4 is answered "no," OCR would find that there was discrimination in violation of title VI. If
questions 1, 2 or 3 are answered "no," or if questions 1 through 4 are answered "yes," there
would be no violation. Id. at 11449.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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friend or associate of the victim. 7 7
If OCR finds that a hostile environment existed under these standards it
then proceeds to determine whether a school had notice of the harassment and
took reasonable steps to respond to the harassment. 78 Notice to the school can
be either actual or constructive. 179 Actual notice will be imputed as long as
any agent or responsible employee of the school received the notice. 80 A
school will be charged with constructive notice:
[I]f, upon reasonably diligent inquiry in the exercise of reasonable care,
it should have known of the discrimination. In other words, if the recipient could have found out about the harassment had it made a proper inquiry, and if the recipient should have made such an inquiry, knowledge
of the harassment will be imputed to the recipient.'8 1
The school can also be charged with constructive notice if it has notice of
some, but not all, of the incidents involved in a particular complaint.'82
Once a school has notice of a hostile environment, it has a legal duty to
take reasonable steps to eliminate it.' 83 If the school took responsive action,
OCR will evaluate the appropriateness of that action by examining disciplinary policies, grievance policies and any applicable anti-harassment policies.'8
Possible elements of appropriate responsive action include the imposition of
disciplinary measures, the development and dissemination of a policy prohibiting harassment, the provision of grievance or complaint procedures, the
implementation of racial awareness training, and the provision of counseling
85
for the victims of racial harassment.
177. Id.

178. Id. at 11450.
179. Id.

180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. In a footnote the guidance states: "Of course, OCR cannot endorse or prescribe
speech or conduct codes or other campus policies to the extent that they violate the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution." Id. at 11450 n.7. An earlier note states that
"[i]n cases in which verbal statements or other forms of expression are involved, consideration
will be given to any implications of the First Amendment to the United State Constitution. In
such cases, regional staff will consult with headquarters." Id. at 11448 n. 1.
185. Id. at 11450-51. The OCR "guidance" on its investigations is essentially an official
compilation of statements which it has made in a number of individual rulings. An excellent
overview of 17 cases of peer harassment investigated and resolved by OCR in 1992 and 1993
can be found in a recently published article by Gail Sorenson. See Gail Paulus Sorenson,
Peer Sexual Harassment: Remedies and Guidelines under Federal Law, 92 ED. L. REP. 1
(1994).
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The procedures for OCR investigations and hearings under Title VI are
found at 34 C.F.R. sections 100.6-100.11 and 34 C.F.R., section 101. These
procedures also apply to Title IX186 and Section 504 proceedings.' 87 The following discussion is taken from a review of those procedures and conversations and correspondence with OCR officials.
Complaints of discrimination can be filed at any OCR regional office by
anyone who believes that an education institution receiving federal funding
has discriminated against someone on the basis of race, color, national origin,
sex, handicap, or age. A complaint must be filed within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, unless the time for filing is extended by the responsible
Department official or his designee. 188 Under OCR procedures, it is required
and to issue written findings
to complete the investigation of any complaint
189
complaint.
the
of
receipt
within 135 days of
The first step in the complaint investigation is for the OCR to send a
Letter of Inquiry to the school. The school must respond within 15 calendar
days from the date of the letter, or, if it cannot respond immediately for any
reason, such as staff's absence, advise the OCR at once. 9 ° Once the OCR has
received the data requested in the Letter of Inquiry it may send an investigator to conduct an on-site visit to the school.' 9'

After the investigation is complete, the OCR will notify both the school
and the complainant of the results of the investigation in a Letter of Findings
(LOF). 192 If the OCR finds that a violation has occurred, it will attempt to
resolve the matter before issuing the LOF so that when issued it will indicate
that, while the violation did take place, it has been resolved and the matter
closed.' 93 If the OCR and the school are unable to reach a settlement agreement, the OCR will then issue the LOF and the parties will have 60 days after its issuance to negotiate a remedy.'9 4 If the parties are still unable to agree
upon an appropriate remedy, OCR is required to initiate enforcement measures within the following 30 days.' 9 5 These enforcement measures can in186. 34 C.F.R. § 104.61 (1993).
187. 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (1993).
188. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(b) (1993).
189. Letter from David J. Gaffny, Chief, Indiana Branch OCR Region V,to Dennis French
(Sept. 12, 1991) (on file with author).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Letter from Harry A. Orris, Director, Elementary and Secondary Education Division
OCR Region V, to Dennis French (Aug. 23, 1991) (on file with author).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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clude requiring that the school provide counseling for both the harasser and
the harassed, conduct sensitivity awareness training, transfer students or even
cut off federal funding.
If the school disagrees with either the findings or the punishment set
down by the OCR, it may appeal the decision to the Civil Rights Reviewing
Authority within the Department of Education, and then to the Secretary of
Education personally. 96 After the school has exhausted these administrative
remedies it may then seek judicial review.'

97

During the course of an investigation, the school may not intimidate,
threaten, coerce or engage in any other discriminatory conduct against anyone who has either taken action or participated in an action to secure rights
protected under the Civil Rights statutes. Under the Freedom of Information
Act the OCR may be required to release the LOF and related correspondence
and records upon request. 198 If such a request is made, the OCR will seek to
protect, to the extent provided by law, personal information which, if released,
could constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. 199
III.

CIVIL LIABILITY

An investigation by the Office of Civil Rights, however, may be the least
of a school district's worries. Numerous students who have suffered harassment at the hands of either students or teachers have attempted to bring actions
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that schools have a constitutional duty to
protect them from such harassment. The most common claim is that the
student's individual liberty interests, guaranteed by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have
been violated.2 z0 Students have also brought claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 ' As discussed in Section A below, most courts have been reluctant to recognize such claims.
A new theory of liability based on violations of the civil rights statutes,
however, has arisen in the last two years. This theory is based on the landmark
case of Franklinv. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 20 2 where the Supreme Court
196. 34 C.F.R. § 100.10(e) (1993).
197. Id.
198. Orris letter, supra note 192; See also Gaffny letter, supra note 189.
199. Id.
200. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. V; "No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
201. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws". U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
202. 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
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held that monetary damages are available for violations of Title IX. 23° In the
months since Franklinwas decided, several courts have allowed actions for
damages under Title VI and under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 20' As
discussed in Section B below, students who have suffered harassment have
now begun to bring suit claiming that the schools' failure to stop such harassment subjected them to a hostile environment in violation of the civil rights
statutes.
A.

1.

Theories of Liability Under Section 1983205

Special Relationship

The primary theory used by plaintiffs in school harassment cases is the
"special relationship theory." According to the plaintiffs, schools have a
special relationship to their students because of state laws requiring children
to attend school and putting the school in the position of in loco parentis. °6
This special relationship, plaintiffs argue, imposes an affirmative duty on the

203. See id.
204. See e.g., Rodgers v. Magnet Cove Pub. Sch., 34 F.3d 642 (8th Cir. 1994); Waldrop v.
Southern Co. Serv. Inc., 24 F.3d 152 (11th Cir. 1994); Pandazides v. Virginia Bd. of Educ.,
13 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1994); Tafoya v. Borboff, 865 F. Supp. 742 (D. N. Mex. 1994); Brown
v. City of Oneota, 858 F. Supp. 340 (N.D. N.Y. 1994); Huber v. Howard County, 849 F.
Supp. 407 (D. Md.; 1994); Wood v. President & Trustees of Spring Hill College, 978 F.2d
1214 (11th Cir. 1992); Kraft v. Memorial Med. Ctr., Inc., 807 F. Supp. 785 (S.D. Ga. 1992);
Miller v. Spicer, 822 F. Supp. 158 (D. Del. 1993); Ali v. City of Clearwater, 807 F. Supp. 701
(M.D. Fla. 1992); Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559 (D. D.C. 1992). The courts
have based these decisions on the language in Franklin pointing out that in Guardians Ass'n
v. Civil Service Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983), "a clear majority [of the Justices] expressed
the view that damages were available under Title VI in an action seeking remedies for an
intentional violation," 112 S. Ct. at 1035, and to the fact that § 505 of the Rehabilitation Act
states that the remedies available for violations of § 504 shall be the same as those set forth in
Title VI. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
There is no requirement that plaintiffs exhaust their remedies with the OCR and
Department of Education prior to filing a suit in Federal Court under any of these statutes.
The Supreme Court announced this rule with regard to Title IX in Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 706, n.41 (1979), and courts relying on Cannon have ruled that
plaintiffs stating claims under Title VI and Section 504 also do not have to exhaust
administrative remedies. See Neighborhood Action Coalition v. City of Canton, 882 F.2d
1012 (6th Cir. 1989) (analyzing Title VI); Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1990)
(analyzing Section 504).
205. Most suits brought against schools for harassment or misconduct have alleged wrongful
behavior on the part of a teacher rather than a student. The same theories of liability have
been used in both types of cases, however, and those cases involving teachers are included in
the following discussion as they are instructive in determining a school's responsibility to
prevent harassment or misconduct by other students.
206. "In the place of a parent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 787 (6th ed. 1990).
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school to provide for the students' safety and to prevent harassment.
The majority of courts have rejected the special relationship theory, but
a few have allowed plaintiffs to proceed under it.
In J.0. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11,207 an action was brought
against school authorities for the alleged sexual molestation of several children by a teacher. 0 8 The court held that the action was barred because there
was not a "special relationship" which placed an affirmative constitutional
duty on the school to protect the children.2 °9 The court based its decision on
the ruling in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Serv.,2 10 where
the Supreme Court held that a county social service agency could not be held
liable for the abuse-related death of a child by its natural father while in his
custody. The DeShaney Court held that the government only had an affirmative duty to protect an individual where the state had exercised its power to
take a person into custody and had rendered the individual unable to care for
21
himself or herself such as with prisoners and mental patients.

Following DeShaney, the Seventh Circuit held that, "School children are
not like mental patients and prisoners such that the state has an affirmative
duty to protect them.

' 212

Thus, the court held that whatever duty of protection

21
a school does owe to a student is best left to laws outside the Constitution,
214
as Illinois had done in Eversole v. Wasson.

3

Most courts have agreed with the Seventh Circuit's decision in J. 0. and
held that a school does not have such a special relationship to a student so as
to protect the student from harassment or attacks by fellow students. In D.R.
v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 21 5 the court held that the
207.
208.
209.
210.

909 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 268.
Id. at 272.
489 U.S. 189 (1989).

211. Id. at 198-99. See also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.C. 97 (1976) (prisoners); Youngberg

v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (mental patients).
212. J.0. 909 F.2d at 272-273.
213. Id. at 272.
214. 398 N.E.2d 1246 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (court recognized a student's tort suit against a
school district for injuries inflicted in a teacher's assault). See generally Annotation, Personal
Liability in Negligence Action of Public School Employee, Other Than Teacher or Executive
or Administrative Officer, for PersonalInjury or Death of Student, 35 A. L. R. 4th 328; See
also Annotation, PersonalLiability of Public School Executive or Administrative Officer in
Negligence Action for Personal Injury or Death of Student, 35 A. L. R. 4th 272; Christopher
Bello, Personal Liability of Public School Teacher in Negligence Action for Personal Injury
or Death of Student, 34 A. L. R. 4th 228; Allan E. Korpela, Tort Liability of Public Schools
and Institutions of Higher Learningfor Injuries Caused by Acts of Fellow Students, 36 A. L.
R. 3d 330.
215. 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992)(en banc).
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school did not have a duty to two female students in a graphic arts class who
alleged that several male students in the same class physically, verbally and
sexually molested them in the unisex bathroom and dark room which were
part of the graphic arts classroom.1 6 Similarly, in Dorothy J. v. Little Rock
Sch. Dist.,217 the court dismissed a due process action brought by the mother
of a mentally retarded student who had been sexually assaulted in the boys'
shower of a high school.

21 8

One court, however, has held that a school was in a special relationship
with a student and had a duty to protect him from harassment and assault by
other students. In Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Sch., 2 19 the student
alleged that during his 5th grade year and part of his 6th grade year he was the
target of physical and verbal abuse by other students on a total of 17 different occasions. 220 The court held that, even under DeShaney, a special relationship existed because both the victim and the perpetrators were under the care
216. See id.
217. 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993).
218. See id. See also Seamons v. Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Utah) (1994) (school did
not have duty to protect football player who was taped to towel rack in locker room by other
players who then showed him to girl he had taken to the homecoming dance); Aurelia D. v.
Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (school did not have duty to
protect fifth grade girl from harassing comments and actions by classmate); Graham v.
Independent Sch. Dist. No. 1-89, 22 F.3d 991 (10th Cir. 1994) (school did not have special
duty to student who was allegedly shot and killed by another student); Maldonado v. Josey,
975 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1992) (court affirmed summary judgment in favor of school corporation
on complaint alleging teacher's failure to supervise her students which led to child's accidental
death by strangulation after he caught his bandana on a hook in the school cloakroom); Doe
v. Bd. of Educ. of Hononegah Community High Sch. Dist. No. 207, 833 F. Supp. 1366 (N.D.
Ill. 1993) (school did not have special duty to protect student who was allegedly sexually
abused by teacher); B.M.H. v. School Bd. of City of Chesapeake, Virginia, 833 F. Supp. 560
(E.D. Va. 1993) (school did not have special duty to student who was sexually assaulted by
fellow student); Hunter v. Carbondale Area Sch. Dist., 829 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Pa. 1993)
(school corporation did not owe special duty to junior high special education student who
was chased off school property after detention period by non-special education students and
drowned in a stream); Elliott v. New Miami Bd. of Educ., 799 F. Supp. 818 (S.D. Ohio 1992)
(court rejected a claim by a student who alleged that she had been repeatedly harassed and
assaulted by other students); Russell v. Fannin County Sch. Dist., 784 F. Supp. 1576 (N.D.
Ga. 1992), aff'd, 981 F.2d 1263 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (court found the fact that fights occurred in
high school on a regular basis was insufficient to establish that the school should have known
that a student beat up by another student was in danger of assault so as to give rise to a duty to
protect the student); Doe v. Douglas County Sch. Dist. Re-l, 770 F. Supp. 591 (D. Colo.
1991) (holding that public school did not have a special relationship with student so as to
impose affirmative duty on the school to protect student from sexual abuse by school
psychologist); Stauffer v. Orangeville Sch. Dist., 1990 WL 304250 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 1990)
(concluding that public school does not have a special relationship with student; otherwise,
"every time a school child is assaulted by the class bully during recess it would be a tort of
constitutional dimensions under § 1983").
219. 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
220. Id. at 642,
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of the school in its parenspatriaecapacity at the time the alleged incidents
occurred.

22 1

2. Deliberately or Recklessly Establishing and Maintaining a
Custom, Practice or Policy Causing Harm to a Student
Plaintiffs have also tried to argue that a school is liable for a student's
injuries even though a special relationship did not exist. They have argued
that by failing to take action to halt harassment or assault the school has
221. Id. at 643. See also Waechter v. School Dist. No. 14-030 of Cassopolis, Michigan,
773 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (court found that a handicapped student who died after
he was required to run 350 yards in less than two minutes as punishment for talking with
another classmate was in a custodial relationship with the teacher who imposed the
punishment); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that
special relationship existed between school and student who alleged that she had been sexually
molested by teacher); cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1066 (1993), reh'g denied, 113 S. Ct. 1436
(1993), reg'g en banc granted and opinion vacated, 987 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd on
different grounds on rehearin, 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
70 (1994). On rehearing, the Fifth Circuit limited its analysis to whether a supervisory
school official can be held personally liable under § 1983 for a subordinant's violation of a
student's constitutional rights. 15 F.3d at 454. The Court refused even to consider whether a
DeShaney special relationship arises in the public school context because the issue was
irrelevant to the facts before it. Id. at 451 n.3.
Three Fifth Circuit panels subsequently addressed the special relationship question in
a school context. In Walton v. Alexander, 20 F.3d 1350 (5th Cir. 1994), reh'g en banc
granted, (5th Cir. July 1, 1994) (No. 93-7313), the party in interest was a student at the

Mississippi School for the Deaf who was sexually assaulted by a fellow student. 20 F.3d at
1352-53. The court found that a special relationship did exist between the school and the
student. Id. at 1355. Among the factors that lead to this conclusion were (1) the school was a
boarding school with 24-hour custody of the student, (2) the student was deaf and lacked the
basic communication skills that normal children possess, (3) the student was obviously not
free to leave while he lived at the school, and (4) economic realities essentially force most
Mississippi families with deaf children to send their children to the school. Id. Thus the
court concluded: "The residential special education program provided by the State of
Mississippi had a significant custodial component wherein Walton was dependent on the
School for his basic needs and lost a substantial measure of his freedom to act." Id. See also
Spivey v. Elliot, 29 F.3d 1522 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (holding Georgia school for the deaf was in
special relationship with eight-year old resident who was sexually assaulted by a thirteenyear old schoolmate, but finding school officials were entitled to qualified immunity because
duty was not clearly established at time of assault).
In Leffall v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1994), however, the court
distinguished Walton and found that there was no custodial relationship between a school and
a student who was shot by another student at a school-sponsored dance held outside regular
school hours. The decision in Leffall, however, is a narrow one. The court stated that because
the shooting took place at a dance which the student was not compelled to attend, it
need not go so far as have some of our sister circuits and conclude that no special
relationship can ever exist between an ordinary public school district and its students;
we conclude only that no such relationship exists during a school-sponsored dance
held outside of the time during which students are required to attend school for nonvoluntary activities.
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maintained a custom, practice or policy which allowed the harm to happen to
a student. Courts faced with this argument have distinguished between
actions by students and teachers. Specifically they have held that an action
can be maintained under this theory against a school for a teacher's actions
because the teacher is a state actor. However, they have held that no action
can be maintained against a school for a student's action because a student is
22

a private actor.1

3. State-Created Danger Theory
Another theory which plaintiffs have attempted to use to impose liability on a school system for the acts of students is the state-created danger
theory. Under this theory the state can be held liable where it affirmatively
acted to create or exacerbate the danger to the individual. Courts, however,
have rejected this theory when applied to situations where a student is
harassed or assaulted by another student. 23

Id. at 529.
Finally, in Johnson v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 1994), the court
again declined to rule on the special relationship question. It held that even if the theory
applied to schools it would not result in liability for the school in the case before it where a
student was killed when he was shot by a non-student trespasser. id. at 203.
222. See D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Voc. Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992)(en
banc); Elliott v. New Miami Bd. of Educ., 799 F. Supp. 818 (S.D. Ohio 1992); Arroyo v.
Myrta PLA, 748 F. Supp. 56 (D. Puerto Rico 1990) (student shot and killed by other student);
but see Guidry v. Rapides Parish School Board, 560 So. 2d 125 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
school liable in common law tort for negligent supervision leading to sexual assault of mentally
retarded student). Most courts directly addressing the question of whether a school corporation
has shown deliberate indifference have held that it did not. See Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep.
Sch. Dist., 996 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1993); Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707 (3d
Cir. 1993); Thelma D. v. Board of Educ. of the City of Louis, 934 F.2d 929 (8th Cir. 1991);
Jane Doe "A" v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis County, 901 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1990); D.T. v.
Independent Sch. Dist. No. 16, 894 F.2d 1176 (10th Cir. 1990); Stoneking v. Bradford Area
Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990); R.L.R. v. Prague
Pub. Sch. Dist. 1-103, 838 F. Supp. 1526 (W.D. Okla. 1993); B.M.H. v. Sch. Bd. of City of
Chesapeake, Va 833 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1993); Hunter v. Carbondale Area Sch. Dist.,
829 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Pa. 1993); K.L. v. Southeast Delco School Dist., 828 F. Supp 1192
(E.D. Pa. 1993); Jones v. Board of Educ. of Sch. Dist., 50, 854 P.2d 1386 (Colo. App. 1993);
Jaques v. Lever, 831 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Ga. 1993); but see Doe v. Bd. of Honnegah Community
High Sch. Dist. No. 207, 833 F. Supp. 1366 (N.D. I1. 1993); Lopez v. Houston Indep. Sch.
Dist., 817 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that genuine issues of material fact existed
whether a school bus driver's conduct in connection with a fight aboard a school bus amounted
to callous indifference and whether his conduct was the cause of injuries suffered by the
student).
223. Leffall, 28 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1994); D.R., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992); Hunter, 829

F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Pa. 1993); Robbins v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 56, 807 F. Supp. 11
(D. Me. 1992).
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4. School District and School Official Immunity Under the
Eleventh Amendment
Another possible argument which school districts and school officials
can make when faced with a Section 1983 action is that they are immune from
liability under because they are not a "person" as defined in that section. At
least two courts have recently held that school corporations are immune from
Section 1983 claims because they are arms of the state government and, thus,
subject to the protection of the Eleventh Amendment.22 4 For school officials,
such immunity, however, only applies to suits which are brought against them
in their official rather than individual capacities.2 25 Suits for damages against
school officials in their individual capacities arising from their official acts
226
are not barred.
These decisions on immunity are based on the text of Section 1983
which does not create substantive rights, but rather provides a cause of action
and remedy for the protection of federally protected civil rights. It provides:
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or other
persons within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other pro227
ceeding for redress.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that neither a state nor its officials
acting in their official capacities are "persons" under Section 1983.228 In
Monell v. Department of Social Services,229 however, the court overruled its
prior ruling in Monroe v. Pape,2 30 "insofar as it holds that local government
units are wholly immune from suit under Section 1983. ' '23i However, the
Supreme Court expressly limited its holding in Monell to local government
224. Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1280 (1993); Board of Trustees of Hamilton Heights Sch. Corp. v. Landry, 622
N.E.2d 1019 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). The Eleventh Amendment states: "[t]he Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
225. See e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358, 361-62 (1991).
226. Id. at 361-65.
227. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
228. See e.g., Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
229. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
230. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
231. Monell at 663.
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units which are not considered a part of the state for Eleventh Amendment
immunity purposes. 23 2 More recently in Howlett v. Rose, 233 the Court concluded that "the State and arms of the State, which have traditionally enjoyed
Eleventh Amendment immunity, are not subject to suit under § 1983 in either
234
federal or state court.
School districts have seized on this language and argued that because
they are governed by extensive state regulations they are armed of the state
and therefore immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. In Belanger
v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist.,235 the court applied a multi-factor balancing test
to determine whether the school district was a state agency for purposes of the
Eleventh Amendment.23 6
To determine whether a governmental agency is in arm of the state, the
following factors must be examined: [1] whether a money judgment
would be satisfied out of state funds, [2] whether the entity performs
central governmental functions, [3] whether the entity may sue or be sued,
[4] whether the entity has the power to take property in its own name237or
only the name of the state, and [5] the corporate status of the entity.
Applying these factors, the court held that the school district was a state
238
agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.
More specifically, the court emphasized that since California school
districts, unlike in most states, had budgets that are controlled and funded by
the state government rather than local districts, a judgment against the school
district would be satisfied out of state funds. 23 9 The court also emphasized,
citing the California Constitution and California case law on the subject that
under California law, the school district was a state agency performing a
240
central governmental function.
232. Id. at 690 n.54.
233. 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990).
234. Id. at 365.
235. 963 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1280 (1993). Belanger was
removed from her position as principal of an elementary school and reassigned to a classroom
teaching position. She alleged that she was reassigned because of her gender and in retaliation
for testifying against the school district in a separate discrimination suit. Id. at 249.
236. Id. at 251.
237. Id. at 250-251 (quoting Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 861 F.2d
198, 201 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1081 (1989)).
238. Id. at 253.
239. Id. at 248.
240. Id. at 253 (citing CAL. CONST. art. IX, §§ 5 & 6; Hall v. City of Taft, 302 P.2d 574
(Cal. 1956); San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 657,
662 (N.D. Ca. 1979); Stones v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 572 F. Supp. 1072,
1077 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 796 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1986).
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The Indiana Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in Board of
Trustees of Hamilton Heights Sch. Corp. v. Landry.2"4 ' Citing both the Indiana Constitution and state and federal case law, the Court held that an Indiana school corporation is not a local government unit but is in arm of the state
for Eleventh Amendment purposes and is therefore not a person amenable to
suit under Section 1983.242
The success of such an Eleventh Amendment defense will vary according to state law. The leading case on the issue is Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle,2 43 the Supreme Court concluded an Ohio school board is "more like a
county or a city than it is like an arm of the state" and that, therefore, it was
not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.2 44 Accordingly, counsel
should make a close examination of the applicable state constitution and
decisional law to determine the propriety of Section 1983 action against a
school board. If it appears that the school system will be immune, the
possibility still exists for an action based on one of the civil rights statutes.
B. Franklin Announces the Availability of Money Damages Under Title IX

Given the limited success achieved in Section 1983 actions, students
who have suffered harassment or abuse have recently turned to the civil rights
statutes as the basis for a cause of action against a school district. This movement has been spurred by the Supreme Court's decision in Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools24 5 that money damages are available under
Title IX.

246

Franklininvolved the sexual harassment of a student by a teacher over
241. 622 N.E.2d 1019 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd on reh'g, 638 N.E.2d 1261 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1994). Landry, a junior high school teacher removed the glossary from the back of 146
science textbooks owned by the school. He was suspended from work without pay for two
days and required to repay $1.00 for each textbook damaged. Following his discipline, Landry
filed a § 1983 claim alleging violation of his constitutional rights, including infringement of
academic freedom and denial of due process. Id. at 1020.
242. Id. at 1024-25 (citing IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; State ex rel. Clark v. Haworth, 23
N.E. 946 (Ind. 1890); State ex rel. Osborn v. Eddington, 195 N. 92 (Ind. 1935); United States
v. Board of School Commissioners of Indianapolis, 368 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Ind. 1973), aff'd,
483 F.2d 1406 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975). In fact, the Hamilton
Heights decision was ultimately reversed, 638 N.E.2d 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) after being
criticized by the Seventh Curcuit as dubious authority. Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26
F.3d 728, 735 (1994).
243. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). Id. at 280.
244. Id. at 280-8 1. Nearly all the other courts considering the issue since Mt. Healthy have
refused to grant local school districts Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Grande Bd. of
Educ. 995 F.2d 992, 995 (10th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (citing cases.)
245. 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
246. See id.
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a period of years. 21 7 The harassment allegedly included sexually oriented
conversations, forcibly kissing the student, telephone calls and coerced intercourse in the teacher's office. 24 8 The student alleged that the district, which
did not have a formal policy and procedure for the reporting and investigation
of sexual harassment and abuse, was aware of and investigated her allegations
but took no action and discouraged her from pressing charges.2 49 The student
filed a complaint with the Office of Civil Rights which investigated the
charges and concluded the district had violated the student's rights by subjecting her to sexual harassment and interfering with her right to complain about
it. 250 The Office of Civil Rights found, however, that the district had come

into compliance with Title IX because the teacher and an administrator had
resigned, and the district had implemented a grievance procedure.2

1

1

The

student then sued.
The District Court dismissed her complaint on the ground that Title IX
252
did not authorize an award of damages, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
A unanimous Supreme Court, however, held that the student had stated a valid
cause of action and allowed her suit, which asked for $6,000,000 in damages
253
from the school district, to go forward.

In reaching its decision, the Court relied both on the general rule "that
absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the
power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought
pursuant to a federal statute" 2 4 and two congressional amendments to Title
IX after the Court had found an implied right of action under it in Cannon v.
University of Chicago.255 The first amendment was the Civil Rights Remedies
Equalization Amendment of 1986,256 which abrogated the States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity under Title IX, Title VI, Section 504 and the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975.257 The second was the Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987,258 which Congress passed "to correct what it considered to be an

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id. at 1031.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1031, n.3.
Id. at 1031-32.
Id. at 1032.
Id. at 1035.
Id. at 1035-36. See Cannon, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1988).
Franklin at 1036.

258. Pub. L. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
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unacceptable decision" in Grove City College v. Bell.259
Specifically, the Court in Grove City had held that the receipt of federal
financial aid by some of a college's students did not trigger institutionwide
coverage under Title IX.26 ° Instead, the receipt of financial aid only imposed
Title IX regulations on the college's financial aid program. 2 1 Congress's
response was to amend Title IX, Title VI and Section 504 by defining a "program" or "activity" to mean all the operations of the entity receiving federal
funding. 26 2 Pointing to these two amendments, the majority of the Court
concluded that "[w]e cannot say, therefore, that Congress has limited the
263
remedies available to a complainant in a suit brought under Title IX."1
The Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Amendment of 1986 was particularly important to Justice Scalia, with whom the Chief Justice and Justice
Thomas joined in a brief concurrence. 2 64 While questioning whether the Court
should ever find implied rights of actions under federal statutes, he noted that
"it is too late in the day to address whether a judicially implied exclusion of
damages under Title IX would be appropriate. The Civil Rights Remedies
Equalization Amendment of 1986, 42 U.S.C. section 2000d-7(a)(2), must be
read, in my view, not only 'as a validation of Cannon's holding,' but also as
265
an implicit acknowledgment that damages are available."

259. Id. at 1036. See Grove City, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
260. Id. at 573.
261. Id. at 574.
262. See 20 U.S.C. § 1686 (1988) (Title IX); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (1988) (Title VI); & 29
U.S.C. § 794(b)(§ 504).
263. Franklin at 1036-37.
264. Id. at 1038-39.
265. Id. at 1039 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue of
whether employees of educational institutions can bring discrimination claims under Title
IX. Lower courts are split on the this question. In Bowers v. Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp. 142,
145 (W.D. Tex. 1994), the court stated that the decisions in Cannon and Franklin "lead this
Court to the conclusion that the Supreme Court would take the next logical step of recognizing
[an employee's] cause of action under Title IX." See also Preston v. Commonwealth of
Virginia, 31 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that implied right of action extends to
employment discrimination on the basis of gender by educational institutions receiving federal
funds); Henschke v. New York Hosp.-Cornell Medical Ctr., 821 F.Supp. 166 (S.D. N.Y.
1993) (same).
Other courts, however, have dismissed Title IX employment discrimination claims,
holding that they are preempted by Title VII. For example, in Wedding v. University of
Toledo, 862 F. Supp. 201, 203 (N.D. Ohio 1994), the court held that Title VII preempted
Title IX employment discrimination claim because "if an employee could maintain an implied
right of action under Title IX, the very comprehensive, detailed, and express provisions of
Title VII could be completely avoided." See also Storey v. Board of Regents, 604 F.Supp.
1200 (W.D. Wis. 1985) (holding that Title VII preempts Title IX employment discrimination
claim); Day v. Wayne County Bd. of Auditors, 749 F.2d 1199 (6th Cir. 1984) (same).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1995

39

Akron Law Review, Vol. 28 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 3

AKRON LAW REvEW

[Vol. 28:2

C. Hostile Environment
Since Franklin was decided, several federal suits have been brought
claiming that school districts failed to take adequate measures to stop male
students from sexually harassing female classmates. 26 6 To date, only a few of
these cases have a resulted in a reported decisions. And, only one of these
decisions features an in-depth discussion of the viability of a hostile environ267
ment claim in a school setting.
1. PetalumaRecognizes Cause of Action for Hostile Environment Discrimination but Requires Proof of Intentional Discrimination for Damages
In Petaluma,a student alleged that she had been repeatedly subjected to
sexual harassment by other students throughout the seventh and eighth grades,
that she had informed school officials of the harassment and they did not
respond to the harassment adequately. 268 Most of the harassment was verbal,
in the form of statements about the student having a hotdog in her pants or that
269
she had sex with hotdogs.
In Petaluma, the court found that a cause of action may be maintained
under Title IX for hostile environment sexual harassment, but held that, where
the harassment is perpetrated by fellow students, the fact that the school knew
or should have known of the harassing behavior and failed to stop it is not
enough to establish liability. 270 Instead, a student must prove intentional discrimination by showing that the schools inaction (or insufficient action) in the
face of complaints of student-to-student harassment was a result of an actual
271
intent to discriminate against the student on the basis of sex.
The Petaluma court based its decision that hostile environment sexual
harassment claims may be brought under Title IX on an earlier decision by a
fellow district court judge in the same district in a case involving alleged
harassment of a student by a teacher. 27 2 In that case, the judge had looked (1)
266. See generally Rorie Sherman, School DistrictsSued on Sexual Harassment by Fellow
Students, NAT'L L. J., Dec. 13, 1993, 10. Two of the suits involve the same school district in
Texas and ask for a total of $1.5M in damages for three junior high school girls who were
subjected to genital groping and obscenities. Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., H-933578 (S.D. Tex.); J.W. v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., (S.D. Tex.). A third case involves a school
district's alleged failure to deal adequately with a teenage boy who, in front of a teacher,
groped and threatened to rape a high school girl. Mennone v. Gordon, 392 CD-467 (D.
Conn.).
267. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
268. Id. at 1564.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1576.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1572-73. See Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288

(N.D. Cal. 1993).
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to the legislative history of Title IX which indicated it was patterned after the
Title VII protections for discrimination in the work place, (2) the Supreme
Court's reliance on a case recognizing hostile environment sexual harassment
in the work place2 73 in analyzing discrimination under Title IX in Franklin,(3)
two appellate court opinions that had adopted Title VII standards for assessing employment discrimination claims under Title IX 274 and (4) the OCR's
policy of applying Title VII standards in the Title IX context. 27 5 Relying on

273. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
274. Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988); Mabry v. State Bd.
of Community Colleges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 849 (1987). Two other cases finding that sexual harassment is a violation of Title
IX are Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977), aff'd on other grounds, 631
F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980); Moire v. Temple Univ. Sch. of Med., 613 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa.
1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1136 (3rd Cir. 1986).
No appellate court has reached the issue of whether a school district can be held liable
for hostile environment discrimination since the Franklin decision. One court, however, has
indicated its willingness to do so in dicta. In Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist No. 3, 35 F.3d
1396 (9th Cir. 1994), the issue before the court was whether a school district had fully complied
with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., in expelling a
fifteen-year-old student with Tourette's Syndrome and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder. The student, Ryan K., had exhibited severe behavioral problems including disrupting
classes by taunting other students with name-calling and profanity, insulting teachers with
vulgar comments, directing sexually-explicit remarks at female students, assaulting students
and teachers, and kicking and hitting classroom furniture. Id. at 1398.
In affirming the school district's removal of Ryan from the classroom, the court noted:
Ryan also directed sexually-explicit remarks at female students, another legitimate
cause for concern among school officials. Given the extremely harmful affects sexual
harassment can have on young female students, public officials have an especially
compelling duty not to tolerate it in the classrooms and hallways of our schools.
See Monica L. Sherer, Comment, No Longer Just Child's Play: School Liability
Under Title IX for Peer Sexual Harassment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2133-35
(1993) (noting that targets of peer sexual harassment often experience embarrassment,
fear, anxiety and loss of self-confidence, which in turn can lead to diminished
opportunities for social and educational growth). Moreover, school officials may
reasonably be concerned about liability for failing to remedy peer sexual harassment
that exposes female students to hostile educational environment.
Id. at 1401-02 (emphasis supplied). In support of its last statement, the court cited Petaluma
and two newspaper articles discussing lawsuits alleging peer sexual harassment. Id. at 1402
n.8. None of these courts, nor the court in Petaluma addressed the issue of whether Title

VII's regulations of harassing speech violate the First Amendment. For a recent commentary
finding that these regulations do violate the First Amendment see Jules B. Gerard, The First
Amendment in a Hostile Environment: A Primeron Free Speech and Sexual Harassment, 68
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1003 (1993). For the ACLU's position on the subject, see Nadine
Strossen, Regulating Workplace Sexual Harassment and Upholding the First Amendment Avoiding A Collision, 37 VILL. L. REV. 757 (1992). See also Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII
as Censorship: Hostile-EnvironmentHarassmentand the FirstAmendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.
J. 481 (1991), for an encyclopedic survey of the cases on the subject.
275. Petaluma at 1571-72.
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these same factors, the court in Petalumafound that student-to-student sexual
276
harassment is actionable under Title IX.
The court, however, found that a student must prove actual intent to
discriminate on the part of the school before damages can be awarded. 277 The
court based this decision on its reading of the decision in Franklin. In
Franklin,the Court stated:
[T]he United States contends that the normal presumption in favor of all
appropriate remedies should not apply because Title IX was enacted pursuant to Congress's Spending Clause Power. In Pennhurst State School
& Hospital v. Halderman,451 U.S. 1,28-29, 101 S. Ct. 1531,67 L.Ed.2d
694, 1545-46 (1981), the Court observed that remedies were limited under such Spending Clause statutes when the alleged violation was unintentional. Respondents and the United States maintain that this presumption should apply equally to intentional violations. We disagree. The
point of not permitting monetary damages for an unintentional violation
is that the receiving entity of federal funds lacks notice that it will be liable for a monetary award. See id. at 17, 101 S. Ct. at 1540. This notice
problem does not arise in a case such as this, in which intentional discrimination is alleged. Unquestionably, Title IX placed on the Gwinnett
County Schools the duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and "when
a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's
sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex." MeritorSavings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49,
2404 (1986). We believe the same rule should apply when a teacher sexu278
ally harasses and abuses a student.
Based on this language, the court in Petaluma stated:
Although the Franklin Court refused to address the question of

276. Id. at 1575. Petalumaand other courts which have addressed the issue, however, have
found that Title VII's allowance of damages actions against individuals does not apply in
Title IX cases. Id. at 1576. See also Seamons v. Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1116 (D. Utah
1994); Bowers v. Baylor Univ., 862 F.Supp. 142, 145 (W.D. Tex. 1994); Bustos v. Illinois
Inst. of Cosmetology, Inc., 1994 WL 710830 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 1994); Slaughter v. Waubonsee
Community College, 1994 WL 663596 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1994). The courts have based their
decisions on the language of Title IX which prohibits discrimination only by educational
"institutions" receiving federal funding. Because individuals cannot be "institutions," the
courts have found that they are not subject to Title IX liability. But see Mann v. University of
Cincinnati, 864 F. Supp. 44 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (holding that suit could be brought against
school officials in their individual capacities).
277. Id. at 1576.
278. 112 S. Ct. at 1037 (quoted in Petaluma at 1574). Since intentional discrimination had
been alleged in Franklin and compensatory relief is available for intentional discrimination in
violation of Spending Clause legislation, the Court refused to address the question of whether

Title IX was actually enacted not just pursuant to the Spending Clause but also pursuant to
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1038 n.8.
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whether Title IX's prohibitions and remedies are co-extensive with Title
VII's, the implication of the Court's opinion is that they are not. Although
not expressly stated in the opinion, the rule laid down by Franklinappears
to be that, under Title IX, damages are available only for intentional
discrimination but respondeat superior liability exists, so that an institution is deemed to have intentionally discriminated when one of its agents
279
has done SO.

Accordingly, the court held that
[N]o damages may be obtained under Title IX (merely) for a school
district's failure to take appropriate action in response to complaints of
student-to-student sexual harassment. Rather, the school district must be
found to have intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff student on
the basis of sex. The school's failure to take appropriate action, as alleged
in plaintiff's complaint, could be circumstantial evidence of intent to
discriminate. Thus, a plaintiff student could proceed against a school
district on the theory that its inaction (or insufficient action) in the face of
complaints of student-to-student sexual harassment was a result of an
actual intent to discriminate against the student on the basis of sex. That,
however, does not appear to be the theory behind plaintiff's complaint.
The Title IX claim is therefore DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
28 °
within thirty (30) days of the date of this order.

279. 830 F. Supp. at 1575 (citations omitted). This, in fact, was the decision reached in
Hastings v. Hancock, 842 F. Supp 1315 (D. Kan. 1993), where the court held that the
substantive law of Title VII should be used to determine whether or not a school may be held
liable for the alleged acts of harassment by a teacher against a student. See also Ward v.
Johns Hopkins Univ., 861 F. Supp. 367 (D. Md. 1994). Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch.
Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Duron v. Hancock, 1993 WL 544519 (D. Kan.,
Dec. 18, 1993) (sexual harassment of employee by supervisor). Two other courts, however,
have held that Title VII's agency principles should not provide a basis for liability on the part
of the school due to the difference between Title VII and Title IX. See Floyd v. Waiters, 831
F. Supp. 867 (M.D. Ga. 1993); R.L.R. v. Prague Pub. Sch. Dist. 1-103, 838 F. Supp. 1526
(W.D. Okla. 1993). It is not clear how these latter two cases square their decisions with
Franklin'slanguage that "the same rule [as when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate
under Title VII] should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student." 112 S.
Ct. at 1037.
280. Id. at 1576 (footnote omitted). See also Mann v. University of Cincinnati, 864 F.
Supp. 44 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (also recognizing that hostile environment claims are viable under
Title II.) The court in Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363 (N.D. Ga.
1994), however, disagreed with the holding in Petaluma that a cause of action could be based
upon a school's inaction in face of complaints of student-to-student harassment. Unfortunately,
it did so with only a conclusory statement and with no discussion of the case law cited in
Petaluma.
Aurelia D. involved a complaint of harassment between two fifth-grade students. The
complaint alleged that a fifth-grade boy had harassed one of his classmates by, among other
things, attempting to touch her breasts and vaginal area, using vulgar language toward her,
placing a doorstop in his pants and behaving in a sexually suggestive manner toward her, and
rubbing his body against her in a suggestive manner. 862 F. Supp. at 364-65. At one point
the student who filed the action and other girls who had been harassed by the same boy asked
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2. Proof of Intentional Discrimination Can Be Shown by Inaction
For now, Petaluma is the only case law on the issue of what type of
discrimination - intentional or unintentional - is needed in order to recover
their teacher if they could go as a group to the principal's office but were not allowed to do
so. Id. at 365.
The district court dismissed the plaintiff's Title IX action stating that it
ha[d] no basis in law. Sexually harassing behavior of a fellow fifth grader is not
part of a school program or activity. Plaintiff does not allege that the Board or an
employee of the Board had any role in the harassment. Thus any harm to [the
student] was not proximately caused by a federally-funded educational provider.
Another district court has suggested that a Title IX cause of action could be
based upon allegations of a school's inaction in the face of complaints of student-tostudent harassment when inaction was intended to discriminate against the child on
the basis of sex. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1576 (N.D.
Cal. 1993). However, this court finds no basis for such a cause of action in Title IX
or case law interpreting it.

Id. at 367.
The court in Seamons v. Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Utah 1994), also held in a
conclusory fashion that no cause of action exists for hostile environment harassment under
Title IX. The court stated that:
Title IX does not expressly create a cause of action based on negligence for hostile
environment. It would be inappropriate for this Court to import the doctrine of
hostile environment sexual harassment from Title VII into this Title IX action.
Contrast PatriciaH. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (N.D.
Cal. 1993).
864 F. Supp. at 1118.
The main reason for the court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint, however, was
his failure to show the school district's alleged discriminatory behavior was based on his sex.
Id. at 1117-19. The complaint alleged that on October 11, 1993, Brian Seamons, a junior at
Sky View High School and a backup quarterback on the football team, was restrained by four
other team members when he was leaving the shower area. Id. at 1115. Using athletic tape,
they taped Brian to a towel rack. After Brian was secured by the tape, a fifth student left the
locker room and returned with the girl Brian had taken to the homecoming dance a few weeks
earlier. She was shown Brian in his taped condition. Id. Brian told the principal and the
head football coach about the incident the next day. After several communications between
the football coach, Brian and other members of the team, Brian was suspended and then
dismissed from the team. Id. On the day following Brian's dismissal from the team, the
superintendent of the school district cancelled the remainder of Sky View High School's

football season because of the taping incident and the subsequent events related to it. Id.
Brian's complaint against the football coach, several school administrators and the
school district alleged that they should be liable under Title IX because, among other things,
(1), the school district knew or should have known of several incidents of sexual harassment
at Sky View High School and other schools prior to the assault against Brian, (2) Brian's
complaints about the assault as to the administrators were met with response that "boys will
be boys," (3) the football coach made public statements regarding the inappropriateness of
imposing discipline or serious sanctions on the perpetrators of the assault because "hazing ...
has always gone on in locker rooms," and (4) the school district knowingly, intentionally, and
continually characterized the locker room incident as "locker room pranks" and "hazings" to
which male students should subject themselves. Id. at 1117. The court found that even if
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damages for student-to-student harassment under Franklin. The last paragraph of the opinion, quoted above, however, shows that the distinction
between intentional and unintentional conduct may not be as clear as schools
might wish it to be. One commentator has stated:
[A]lthough the opinion might suggest that intentional conduct must come
from [an] employee or agent of the [school] district as opposed to a
student's peer, the court['s last paragraph] clearly leaves open the door for
plaintiff to prove that knowledge coupled with malfeasance can suggest
28
intentional conduct. '

these allegations were taken as true they were not sufficient to support a Title IX claim
because there was no showing that any of the alleged actions showed an intent to discriminate
against Brian on the basis of his sex. Id.
The court stated:
Defendants' statement that "boys will be boys" does not legally support Plaintiffs'
allegation that Defendants were motivated by an intent to discriminate against Brian
on the basis of his sex. Taken in any reasonable light, and assuming the truth of the
allegations as we must for the purposes of this motion, such a statement suggests at
most an observation that students of the school, who happen by virtue of their birth
to be male, occasionally commit immature and inappropriate acts during their path
(hopefully) to maturity. Similar comments may be, and no doubt are, said about
female students. But it strains common sense and any reasonable construction of
Title IX's anti-sex-discrimination purpose to crowd such comments by school officials
into an actionable claim of intentional discrimination based on sex.

The lack of adequate allegations to support a sexual harassment claim is fatal to
Plaintiffs' hostile environment sexual harassment claim as well. The people who
are directly affected by the situation at Sky View High School - especially Brian may be convinced that a "hostile environment" existed at the school. It is important,
however, to distinguish the common-sense definition of that term from its legal
meaning within the sex-discrimination context. Liability for hostile environment
sexual harassment exists under Title VII only when: (1) an employee engages in
sexual harassment while acting in the course and scope of employment; (2) an
employer negligently or recklessly fails to remedy or prevent a hostile or offensive
work environment of which management-level employees know, or the exercise of
reasonable care should have known; or (3) an employee's act of sexual harassment
may be imputed to the employer if the employer's delegation of authority enabled
the employee to act. Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dept., 916 F.2d 572,
577 (10th Cir. 1990). Because Plaintiffs have not alleged facts supporting a claim
of sexual harassment and because they have also failed to meet the more specific
requirements of hostile environment as explained in Hirschfeld, it is clear they have
no basisfor asserting a claim under Title IX even if this Court were to apply case
law from Title VII.
864 F. Supp. at 1118-19 (emphasis supplied). See also Murray v. New York Univ. College of

Dentistry, 1994 WL 53341 (S.D.N.Y. September 29, 1994) (recognizing split on applicability
hostile environment claim to Title IX action.)
281. Ronald J. Knox, Liability of School Employers For Sexual Harassment, 36 FOR THE
DEFENSE 13, 16 (March 1994).
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Knowledge will be the key element in determining school liability in
hostile environment actions brought under Title VI, Title IX and Section 504.
Specifically two kinds of knowledge are important. The first is notice of the
requirements of these federal statutes.
The court in Petaluma placed great emphasis on the Franklin Court's
characterization of PennhurstState Sch. & Hosp. as barring remedies under
Spending Clause statutes when the alleged violation was unintentional, and
its statement that the "point of not permitting monetary damages for an unintentional violation is that the receiving entity of federal funds lacks notice that
it will be liable for a monetary award."28' 2 Given the decision in Cannon, the
two amendments to Title IX and now the decision in Franklin,however, it is
highly unlikely that any school corporation could now claim that it lacks
notice that it will be liable for a monetary award.
Moreover, a close examination of the language in Pennhurstreveals that
even under the Spending Clause, Congress can impose strong requirements on
recipients of its funds. The Court in Pennhurst stated that:
our cases have long recognized that Congress may fix the terms on which
it shall disburse federal money to the States .... [L]egislation enacted
pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in
return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed
conditions. The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the
spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly
'
accepts the terms of the "contract."283
"Congress must express clearly its intent to impose conditions on the grant of
federal funds so that the States can knowingly decide whether or not to accept
'
those funds."284
Similar language is found in GuardiansAss'n v. Civil Serv. Commission
of the City of New York,2 5 where the court found that while discriminatory

282. Franklin at 1037 (emphasis added).
283. Id. at 17 (citation omitted).
284. Id. at 24.
285. 463 U.S. 582 (1983). In Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agriculture, 998 F.2d 824
(10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 580 (1994), the defendant argued that all Title IX
actions require proof of discriminatory intent. The court, citing Guardians, rejected this
argument.
The issue in Roberts was whether Colorado State University had violated Title IX
when it chose to discontinue its women's varsity fast pitch softball team. The university
argued that the plaintiffs had to show discriminatory intent to show that the action violated
Title IX.
Defendant reasons that because Title IX was modeled on Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to -4a, and because discriminatory intent is required

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol28/iss2/3

46

Milani: Harassing Speech in the Public Schools

Fall/Winter 19951

HARASSING SPEECH IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

intent was not an essential element of a Title VI violation, a private plaintiff
could recover only injunctive, non-compensatory relief for unintentional
2 86
violations of Title VI.
Closer examination of the facts in Guardiansand Pennhurst,however,
shows that there is a sharp distinction between them and a school's responsibility for student-to-student harassment like that seen in Petaluma. For
example, in Guardians,the court noted that
[t]he discrimination was unintentional and resulted from the disproportionate impact of the entry-level test on racial minorities. In this and similar situations, it is not immediately obvious what the grantee's obligations
under the federal program were and it is surely not obvious that the
grantee was aware that it7 was administering the program in violation of the
28

statute or regulations.

It was also not obvious to the grantee in Pennhurstthat it was in viola-

tion of any statute of regulations. The question there was whether or not
Section 6010 of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights
Act 288 created a substantive right in favor of the mentally retarded to "approto prove a violation of Title VI, see Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463
U.S. 582, 608 n.1, 103 S.Ct. 3221, 3225 n.1, 77 L.Ed.2d 866 (1983) (Powell, J.,
concurring), proof of a Title IX violation must therefore also require intent.
Defendants neglect to consider the additional holding of Guardians, that
"although Title VI itself requires proof of discriminatory intent, the administrative
regulations [under Title VI] incorporating a disparate impact standard are valid." Id.
at 584 n.2, 103 S.Ct. at 3223 n.2 (opinion of White, J.). Plaintiffs' complaint alleges
violations of both Title IX and of the implementing regulations. If we accept the
analogy to Title VI, then Guardianswould permit us to find a violation of Title IX's
regulations without proof of discriminatory intent. See Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678
F. Supp. 517, 539-40 (E.D. Pa. 1987), modified 1988 WL 3845, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 761.
Further, despite the fact that Title IX was explicitly modeled on Title VI, this
court has held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 17, is "the most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX's substantive standards,
including the question of whether 'disparate impact' is sufficient to establish
discrimination under Title IX." Mabry v. State Bd.of Community Colleges &
OccupationalEduc., 813 F.2d 311, 316 n. 6 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849,
108 S.Ct. 148, 98 L.Ed.2d 104 (1987). Because it is well settled that Title VII does
not require proof of overt discrimination, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k), the district court did
not err here in failing to require proof of discriminatory intent.
998 F.2d at 832-33 (footnotes omitted). In a footnote the court stated that the Supreme
Court's decision in Franklin on the intent requirement for monetary damages was not contrary
to the Guardiansholding. Id. at 832 n. 13.
286. Id. at 607, n.27.
287. Id. at 598 (emphasis added).
288. 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1975) (repealed 1984).
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priate treatment" in the "least restrictive" environment. 28 9 The court found
nothing in either the Act or its legislative history to suggest such a congres2 90
sional intent.
In the area of harassing speech, however, it is difficult for schools to
argue that they do not know what their obligations are under Title IX, Title VI
and Section 504. The OCR provided a definition of sexual harassment in 1981
and has been conducting compliance reviews and complaint investigations
under all the civil rights statutes for over a decade. 291 And, in 1994 it provided
explicit "guidance" on how schools must respond to incidents of racial harassment. 292 Schools can, or should, know what is required of them when they are
confronted with student-to-student harassing speech.
The second kind of knowledge is notice of conditions creating a hostile
environment. If a school has such notice, a failure to take such appropriate
action is in itself an "intentional" action on the part of the school and should
subject it to liability.
In fact, a school attorney commenting on the decision in Petalumain an
article appearing in For the Defense stated that while the PetalumaCourt's
decision was understandable in light of the Supreme Court's finding in
Franklin,
it is somewhat disingenuous to conclude that a school district that knows
about a pattern in practice of sexual harassment; but does nothing, and in
fact encourages the victims to remain silent, does not engage in an intena system designed to discriminate against a
tional act of perpetuating
293
purported victim.
He then further stated:
It is difficult to imagine when a school district - or other employer receiving the number and frequency of complaints as did the Petaluma
with intentional discrimination for
School District, would not be charged
294
failure to act on those complaints.
Thus, if for no other reason then because of liability concerns, the time
has come for schools to establish policies to train its employees in detecting
and correcting potential abuse problems.

289. Pennhurst at 24.
290. Id. at 18.
291.
292.
293.
294.

See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 167-85 and accompanying text.
Knox, supra note 281 at 16.
Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol28/iss2/3

48

Milani: Harassing Speech in the Public Schools

Fall/Winter 1995]

HARASSING SPEECH IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

235

IV. CONCLUSION
Schools have broad latitude in proscribing student speech. School
speech codes should pass constitutional muster as long as they apply to fighting words generally and are not content-based. If the harassing and hostile
speech is pervasive and persistent, a hostile environment may arise and subject the school to both a complaint investigation by the OCR andpossible civil
liability under Section 1983, Title XI, Title VI, or Section 504. Schools can
and must act to proscribe harassing speech not only because it is good for their
students but because it is good for their budgets.
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